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An automated road vehicle in public service: what to verify first

Driverless and driver-assistance vehicles operating on public roads in live service. The Register holds 5 comparable cases. Below are the controls that were missing or failed in them, those missing where harm followed first, each with the cases behind it and the rules that map to it. It shows what to verify, not that a deployment is safe.

Compared against
Road vehicles · Production
Assumes
Your system is of this kind. The Register tags each case by sector, by how far the system acted alone, and by context; it does not yet tag what the system could reach (credentials, money, production data, the open web), so this result cannot narrow by that.
Evidence as of
2026-11-16, from 40 published cases
Not included
Deployments that went well, which the Register does not collect; cases still inside a company's 14-day right of reply.
5comparable cases in the Register: 3 ended in harmRoad vehicles · Production
3 ended in harm2 stopped by the operator's control

What to put in place first

6 controls, those missing where harm followed first. The order shows where failures occurred in these cases, not which control matters most for you. Rule mappings are drafts until a person checks them, and none is legal advice.

  1. Missing where harm followed
  2. 1
    Hard domain restriction Prevents the action Envelope
    Operating domain enforced mechanically (geofence, environment scoping, operational design domain).
    missing in 3 of 5 · 2 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • Waymo construction zones 2026 (failed): Failed: Construction-zone recognition was present and failed: the recall report says the system was 'failing to recognize the construction zone' or prioritizing other freeway hazards, and vehicles drove past ramp-closure signs into pre-planned zones. No hard limit fed by planned-closure data is evidenced before the events. the amended report adds operational changes to 'better identify and mitigate potential entry into pre-planned construction zones'.
    • Benavides v. Tesla 2025 (failed): Failed: Design-domain restriction (engagement allowed off-domain). Absent: Hard geofence to the design domain.
    • Tesla FSD reduced visibility (absent): No hard restriction on engaging FSD in reduced visibility is evidenced: NHTSA is still asking Tesla which reduced-visibility conditions make the system disengage, and quotes Tesla posts that FSD Supervised 'can drive in whiteout conditions' and 'isn't limited to select highways or specific conditions'
  3. 2
    Degraded-input detection Detects it Inputs
    The system knows when it cannot see and changes behavior.
    missing in 3 of 5 · 2 ended in harm · tied with the one above
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • Zoox smoke scene 2026 (failed): Failed: Heavy-smoke detection and response: per the recall, the software may not detect and respond to heavy smoke in certain situations, particularly in active emergency scenes. the scene had not been cordoned off with cones.
    • Cruise 2023 (failed): Under-vehicle person detection
    • Tesla FSD reduced visibility (failed): Degraded-visibility detection and driver warning: NHTSA's stated concern is that FSD's degradation detection system, as first deployed and as updated, fails to detect a degraded state in glare and airborne obscurants and to warn the driver in time (concerns under investigation, not a finding)
  4. 3
    Halt and hand off on uncertainty or refusal Prevents the action Decision
    The minimal-risk condition: when blocked or unsure, stop and ask.
    missing in 1 of 5 · 1 ended in harm
    Rules that map to it none mapped for this sector
    What it would have looked like in those cases
  5. 4
    Machine-enforceable scope Prevents the action Mandate
    The task's scope exists as an enforced constraint, not only as an instruction.
    missing in 1 of 5 · 1 ended in harm · tied with the one above
    Rules that map to it none mapped for this sector
    What it would have looked like in those cases
  6. 5
    Automated fail-safe Limits the damage Recovery
    Safe stop or degradation the system performs itself.
    missing in 1 of 5 · 1 ended in harm · worked in 1 · tied with the one above
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    Where it was in place and worked
  7. 6
    Reporting integrity Establishes what happened Evidence
    Reconciliation of what the principal reports with the evidence it holds.
    missing in 1 of 5 · 1 ended in harm · worked in 1 · tied with the one above
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • Cruise 2023 (absent): Reconciliation of video evidence with written regulatory reports
    Where it was in place and worked
    • Tesla FSD reduced visibility: Worked: Mandatory crash reports under NHTSA's Standing General Order prompted the investigation. NHTSA also records Tesla's description of internal data and labeling limitations that NHTSA believes could have led to under-reporting of these crashes.

3 more controls seen in these cases

  1. 7
    Human takeover with a time window Limits the damage Recovery
    Teleoperation, holding periods, delays that give a human time.
    missing in 0 of 5 · worked in 1
    Where it was in place and worked
    • Zoox smoke scene 2026: Worked: Remote teleguidance: the vehicle reversed under a teleguidance tactician's guidance. no timing is disclosed, and the filing does not say whether the person took over driving.
  2. 8
    Internal review, restriction, recall, disclosure with regulator visibility.
    missing in 0 of 5 · worked in 2 · tied with the one above
    Where it was in place and worked
    • Zoox smoke scene 2026: Voluntary recall process
    • Waymo construction zones 2026: Worked: Waymo's Field Safety Committee began reviewing the April events on 20 April and met on 19 May, the day after the May events. each review was followed by freeway driving restrictions. The first lasted until operational mitigations for freeway closures were in place, and seven vehicles then entered active construction lanes on 18 May, in the San Francisco Bay Area and by a different cue (cones marking a closed adjacent lane). the report does not say where the April restriction applied or when it ended. The second restriction (freeway service in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Phoenix and Miami, per Waymo's statement to TechCrunch on 21 May) held while the Safety Board reviewed the issue on 1 and 8 June and decided to recall. the software remedy reached all affected vehicles between 16 and 29 June and freeway operations began resuming on 25 June (amended report). The recall was filed with NHTSA.
  3. 9
    Independent audit log Establishes what happened Evidence
    A record of actions the actor cannot write to or alter.
    missing in 0 of 5 · worked in 2 · tied with the one above
    Where it was in place and worked
    • Cruise 2023: Video capture and later production
    • Benavides v. Tesla 2025: Vehicle data capture (the data survived on the car's Autopilot computer and was obtained for trial after a dispute over whether Tesla had withheld it)
How to read this list. A count shows how often a control was missing or failed in the 5 comparable cases the Register holds. It does not show how well the control works, how likely a failure is, or how risky your deployment is: the Register is a selected set of documented cases, with no record of deployments that went well. This is not a risk score. Controls are ordered by the number of comparable cases that ended in harm, then by the number of comparable cases in all; where two controls have the same counts they are marked as tied, and the order between them carries no meaning. Whether a rule applies to you depends on facts this page does not know; the mappings show which control a rule's text calls for, not that the rule binds your organization.

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Secure Autonomous checklist
Profile: Road vehicles · Production
Comparable cases: 5 (3 ended in harm). Built 2026-11-16 from 40 cases.

[ ] 1. Hard domain restriction (C-E2, Envelope; prevents the action): Operating domain enforced mechanically (geofence, environment scoping, operational design domain).
    Observed missing in 3 of 5 comparable included cases, 2 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: California DMV AV regulations (required by the text); EU Machinery Regulation (required by the text); EU ADS type-approval (2022/1426) (required by the text); Germany autonomous driving law (StVG, AFGBV) (required by the text); UK automated passenger service permits (implied); China ICV access, recall and OTA notice (implied); UN Regulation 185 (driverless systems) (proposed); ISO 21448 (SOTIF) (recommended).
    - Waymo construction zones 2026 (REG-0013): Failed: Construction-zone recognition was present and failed: the recall report says the system was 'failing to recognize the construction zone' or prioritizing other freeway hazards, and vehicles drove past ramp-closure signs into pre-planned zones. No hard limit fed by planned-closure data is evidenced before the events. the amended report adds operational changes to 'better identify and mitigate potential entry into pre-planned construction zones'.
    - Benavides v. Tesla 2025 (REG-0016): Failed: Design-domain restriction (engagement allowed off-domain). Absent: Hard geofence to the design domain.
    - Tesla FSD reduced visibility (REG-0017): No hard restriction on engaging FSD in reduced visibility is evidenced: NHTSA is still asking Tesla which reduced-visibility conditions make the system disengage, and quotes Tesla posts that FSD Supervised 'can drive in whiteout conditions' and 'isn't limited to select highways or specific conditions'

[ ] 2. Degraded-input detection (C-I3, Inputs; detects it): The system knows when it cannot see and changes behavior.
    Observed missing in 3 of 5 comparable included cases, 2 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: EU ADS type-approval (2022/1426) (required by the text); FMVSS 127 (automatic emergency braking) (proposed); ISO 21448 (SOTIF) (recommended).
    - Zoox smoke scene 2026 (REG-0002): Failed: Heavy-smoke detection and response: per the recall, the software may not detect and respond to heavy smoke in certain situations, particularly in active emergency scenes. the scene had not been cordoned off with cones.
    - Cruise 2023 (REG-0003): Under-vehicle person detection
    - Tesla FSD reduced visibility (REG-0017): Degraded-visibility detection and driver warning: NHTSA's stated concern is that FSD's degradation detection system, as first deployed and as updated, fails to detect a degraded state in glare and airborne obscurants and to warn the driver in time (concerns under investigation, not a finding)

[ ] 3. Halt and hand off on uncertainty or refusal (C-D2, Decision; prevents the action): The minimal-risk condition: when blocked or unsure, stop and ask.
    Observed missing in 1 of 5 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    - Benavides v. Tesla 2025 (REG-0016): Stop at end-of-road

[ ] 4. Machine-enforceable scope (C-M2, Mandate; prevents the action): The task's scope exists as an enforced constraint, not only as an instruction.
    Observed missing in 1 of 5 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    - Benavides v. Tesla 2025 (REG-0016): Driver attention as the envelope

[ ] 5. Automated fail-safe (C-R2, Recovery; limits the damage): Safe stop or degradation the system performs itself.
    Observed missing in 1 of 5 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: Texas AV authorization (SB 2807) (required by the text); EU ADS type-approval (2022/1426) (required by the text); Germany autonomous driving law (StVG, AFGBV) (required by the text); California DMV AV regulations (implied); OMB M-25-21 and M-25-22 (implied); FMVSS 127 (automatic emergency braking) (proposed); UN Regulation 185 (driverless systems) (proposed); UK Automated Vehicles Act (authorisation) (proposed); NIST AI RMF (recommended); NHTSA vehicle cybersecurity practices (recommended).
    - Cruise 2023 (REG-0003): Post-collision behavior logic

[ ] 6. Reporting integrity (C-V2, Evidence; establishes what happened): Reconciliation of what the principal reports with the evidence it holds.
    Observed missing in 1 of 5 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: NHTSA Standing General Order 2021-01 (required by the text); California DMV AV regulations (required by the text); CPUC driverless permits (required by the text); BIS connected vehicles rule (required by the text); SEC cyber incident disclosure (required by the text); EU Cyber Resilience Act (required by the text); NIS2 Directive (required by the text); EU ADS type-approval (2022/1426) (required by the text); Germany autonomous driving law (StVG, AFGBV) (required by the text); China ICV access, recall and OTA notice (required by the text); 49 CFR Part 573 (recalls) (implied); UN Regulation 155 (implied); UK automated passenger service permits (implied); Korea AI Basic Act (implied); EU AI Act (proposed); CIRCIA incident reporting (proposed); UN Regulation 185 (driverless systems) (proposed); UK Automated Vehicles Act (authorisation) (proposed).
    - Cruise 2023 (REG-0003): Reconciliation of video evidence with written regulatory reports

Source: secureautonomous.com/check/#road.production

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