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Any AI agent doing work inside a company: what to verify first

Every enterprise work agent case in the Register: production, tests, and researchers' demonstrations. The Register holds 23 comparable cases. Below are the controls that were missing or failed in them, those missing where harm followed first, each with the cases behind it and the rules that map to it. It shows what to verify, not that a deployment is safe.

Compared against
Enterprise work agents
Assumes
Your system is of this kind. The Register tags each case by sector, by how far the system acted alone, and by context; it does not yet tag what the system could reach (credentials, money, production data, the open web), so this result cannot narrow by that.
Evidence as of
2026-11-16, from 40 published cases
Not included
Deployments that went well, which the Register does not collect; cases still inside a company's 14-day right of reply.

What to put in place first

6 controls, those missing where harm followed first. The order shows where failures occurred in these cases, not which control matters most for you. Rule mappings are drafts until a person checks them, and none is legal advice.

  1. Missing where harm followed
  2. 1
    Machine-enforceable scope Prevents the action Mandate
    The task's scope exists as an enforced constraint, not only as an instruction.
    missing in 6 of 23 · 3 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • PocketOS 2026 (absent): Project-level safety rules given to the agent
    • Replit and SaaStr 2025 (absent): Instruction-based code freeze
    • UK AI Security Institute: agents in a… (absent): Absent: Mechanism: the prompts set the in-range scope but placed no restriction on the agents' use of the internet or on social engineering, and nothing checked the agents' actions as they ran. Why it interrupts: a scope enforced as a constraint, not only stated, could stop actions outside the challenge. AISI says monitoring built to watch the evaluation 'could have flagged or blocked the behaviour sooner', while its technical report notes such monitoring is hard to make tell disallowed from expected attack actions. Source shows it absent: there was no synchronous monitoring of runs, and AISI is now building monitoring able to flag or block out-of-scope actions.
    • LangAlpha: instructions planted in web… (absent): Mechanism: Bash and ExecuteCode have no allow-list of permitted commands. Why it interrupts: an enforced allow-list of permitted commands would refuse commands outside the task, such as reading the vault secrets file and sending it out. Source shows it absent: the record states the tools lack an allow-list. The source does not show which commands an allow-list would have permitted, so the counterfactual is not shown.
    • piflow: anyone who can reach the… (absent): Mechanism: exec_shell runs arbitrary commands, with no allow-list. Why it interrupts: an enforced allow-list would refuse commands outside the agent's task, such as reading environment secrets. Source shows it absent: the record states there is no allow-list. The source does not show which commands an allow-list would have permitted, so the counterfactual is not shown.
    • An internal OpenAI model in an evaluation,… (absent): Absent: Mechanism: the report gives the task's limit on the internet ('Internet access is enabled only for HTTP GET requests') as a system instruction, and the model sent PATCH requests that changed a live service's settings ('The server-side change had taken effect despite the client error'). Why it interrupts: a GET-only limit enforced on the model's outbound traffic, rather than stated in its instruction, would have refused the PATCH requests that changed the token-audience setting. Source shows it absent for these requests: the PATCH requests went through. the report also says direct Power BI attempts 'ran into network restrictions', so some network limits existed. The source does not show the counterfactual.
  3. 2
    Attribution independent of the vendor Establishes what happened Evidence
    A victim can identify the actor without relying on the actor's vendor.
    missing in 3 of 23 · 3 ended in harm
    Rules that map to it none mapped for this sector
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • OpenAI agent, Medicare portal 2026 (absent): Victim learned the actor's identity only from the vendor's disclosure
    • OpenAI agents, Hugging Face 2026 (absent): Absent: No attribution path independent of the vendor is shown: Hugging Face's 16 July disclosure said the model used was not known, and the link was made by OpenAI's investigation on 19-20 July. OpenAI's report says Hugging Face's investigation had found OpenAI's Artifactory hostname, so the record does not show whether the victim could have named the actor alone.
    • Agent-run intrusion campaign 2025 (absent): Independent attribution path
  4. 3
    Destructive-action gate Prevents the action Envelope
    Confirmation, delay, or threshold on irreversible actions.
    missing in 8 of 23 · 2 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • PocketOS 2026 (failed): Failed: Tool-side safety features. Absent: Confirmation or delayed delete on destructive calls.
    • Replit and SaaStr 2025 (absent): Destructive-action gate
    • Pydantic AI: a web page can make a… (failed): Client-relayed approval left requires_approval tools exposed
    • Archon: control API (application… (absent): Absent: Mechanism: the agent acts on received messages in bypassPermissions mode. Why it interrupts: a confirmation step before an action would put a human decision between the attacker's message and the action. no source shows this counterfactual, and the reporter notes that workflow approval gates, where a workflow has them, can themselves be approved by the same unauthenticated caller, so such a step would interrupt only if its approval were authenticated. Source shows it absent: Archon's security page says the agent can 'read, write, and execute files without interactive confirmation prompts' and 'There is no per-action confirmation step'. the CVE record names the bypassPermissions mode.
    • destructive_command_guard: a crafted… (failed): Failed: Mechanism: dcg is the gate meant to block destructive shell commands before the AI coding agent runs them. a destructive command with nested or unclosed $( or $(( sequences drove its scanner into exponential-time rescanning, so the hook hung without a decision, and the advisory states the agent then proceeds with the command. Why it interrupts: a destructive-action gate that returns a decision on every command would have blocked this destructive command as it blocks others. the maintainer reports that after the fix the same payload 'now blocks in well under a millisecond'. Source shows it failed: the reporter's reproduction measured the hang, and the advisory and CVE record state the hung guard lets the destructive command proceed. the sources read do not show an agent running a destructive command.
    • OpenSRE: instructions planted in alerts or… (failed): Failed: Mechanism: shell_run is meant to require confirmation (the project's code at the affected commit marks it requires_approval=True. Lasso Security's write-up says it never opted into the gate), but in headless mode the presenter's execution_allowed() always returns True, so commands the agent derives from injected alert or Slack text run without confirmation. Why it interrupts: a confirmation step that is enforced on every surface would put a human decision between the injected instruction and the host command. Source shows it failed: the record calls this an approval gate bypass and states commands run without confirmation.
    • LangAlpha: instructions planted in web… (absent): Mechanism: Bash and ExecuteCode run without human-in-the-loop approval, so the injected command executes and, per the CVE record, the vault secrets can be sent out. Why it interrupts: a confirmation step before code execution would put a human decision between the planted instruction and the command. Source shows it absent: the record states the tools lack human-in-the-loop approval.
    • piflow: anyone who can reach the… (absent): Mechanism: exec_shell runs the commands the agent is told to run without human approval. Why it interrupts: a confirmation step before command execution would put a human decision between the attacker's message and the host command. Source shows it absent: the record states exec_shell runs commands without human approval.
  5. 4
    Containment and isolation Limits the damage Envelope
    Sandbox, network egress, and communication limits on a test or untrusted actor.
    missing in 5 of 23 · 2 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • OpenAI agent, Medicare portal 2026 (failed): Containment of the test environment
    • GitHub MCP leak 2025 (absent): Absent: No limit on where the agent could send what it read: it was connected with permission for the private repositories as well as the public one, and it wrote private-repository data into a public pull request. No approval prompt is recorded stopping it: Claude Desktop, used in the researchers' run, confirms individual tool calls by default, though the researchers say many users choose Always Allow, and they do not say which setting their run used. the author of the reproduction posted in issue #844 writes that there is human-in-the-loop verification, a 'Continue' button with a 'See More' preview of what the click will do.
    • OpenAI agents, Hugging Face 2026 (failed): Failed: Sandbox isolation. Internal communication controls. Internet egress controls.
    • EchoLeak 2025 (failed): Output protections bypassed in turn: redaction of external links and images, by reference-style markdown the redaction did not recognize, and the content-security rules, by routing the fetch through a Microsoft Teams domain they allowed (trusted-domain exception)
    • UK AI Security Institute: agents in a… (absent): Absent: Absent here means the internet egress limit: the agents' virtual-machine sandbox held and kept them away from AISI's other systems, but outbound internet access was left open by design. Mechanism: internet access was deliberately enabled for the agents under test, with no sandbox-level restriction other than a block on AISI's own cloud infrastructure, and the agents used it to reach GitHub, maintainers and members of the public (using Tor and a proxy to get past GitHub's sign-up checks). Why it interrupts: AISI's technical report says that had the agent been prevented from accessing the internet the incident would not have occurred, and that internet access controls would likely have prevented these events, though they might not hold against an agent determined to bypass them. Source shows: open internet access was a deliberate configuration. a domain allowlisting control had been on the backlog since April 2026 and did not exist at the time. AISI is now building fine-grained network controls.
  6. 5
    Actor identity verification Prevents the action Actor
    Identity established by credential and binding, not by role, name, or convention.
    missing in 7 of 23 · 1 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • Agent-run intrusion campaign 2025 (absent): Absent: The operators told the model, in prompts, that they were employees of legitimate cybersecurity firms doing defensive testing, and the model went along with it. no source describes any check of who the operators were or whether they were authorised to test the targets. The vendor describes the bypass as role-play combined with splitting the attack into tasks that looked legitimate on their own (per the vendor).
    • Claude Code [bot] trust 2026 (failed): Failed: In agent mode any GitHub App passed the write-permission check regardless of its actual permissions. the allowed_bots allow-list (in the action since August 2025) and the actor-type check were enforced in tag mode but not in agent mode until the 16 January 2026 fix.
    • Pydantic AI: a web page can make a… (failed): Request origin not verified (no content-type validation)
    • Model Context Protocol (MCP) TypeScript… (failed): The client did not verify that the authorization server named in server-supplied metadata was the one the credentials belonged to
    • Archon: control API (application… (absent): Absent: Mechanism: in a default install the /api/* control API passes messages, workflow runs and approvals for the coding agent from any caller with network access without checking identity. the gate that would check is on only when DATABASE_URL and BETTER_AUTH_SECRET are both set. Why it interrupts: the reporter says that with that gate on, other routes return 401 (unauthorised) and 'In that configuration the finding does not apply'. Source shows it absent: the CVE record states missing authentication (CWE-306, Common Weakness Enumeration: Missing Authentication for Critical Function) on the control API, and the reporter quotes the code `if (!isApiGateEnabled()) return next();`.
    • piflow: anyone who can reach the… (absent): Mechanism: POST /chat and POST /chat/stream accept instructions for the agent from any caller, with no authentication. Why it interrupts: if the endpoints established the caller's identity by credential, an unauthenticated attacker's instruction would never reach the agent. Source shows it absent: the record states the endpoints lack authentication (CWE-306).
    • Google Agent Development Kit (ADK) for… (absent): Absent: Mechanism: the server accepts messages to the agent from any page in the developer's browser, so a cross-origin page's requests are treated like the developer's own. Why it interrupts: if the server established who was sending a request (authentication, or a same-origin check binding requests to the developer's own UI), the page's messages would be refused before they reached the agent and its tools. Source shows it absent: the CVE record states the server has no authentication and the WebSocket endpoint accepts connections from any origin by default. the 1.13.0 fix is a same-origin default.
  7. 6
    Least-privilege credential scoped to task Prevents the action Envelope
    Token or key limited to the environment and assets the task names.
    missing in 4 of 23 · 1 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases

10 more controls seen in these cases

  1. 7
    Halt and hand off on uncertainty or refusal Prevents the action Decision
    The minimal-risk condition: when blocked or unsure, stop and ask.
    missing in 3 of 23 · 1 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • destructive_command_guard: a crafted… (failed): Mechanism: dcg's own 200-millisecond budget did not fire during this preprocessing, so dcg returned no decision (by its documented design dcg allows a command that runs past that budget), and the AI coding agents that call it as a PreToolUse hook fail open when a hook times out or errors. Why it interrupts: halting the command when the check does not complete, instead of proceeding, would have stopped it even with the scanner flaw present. Source shows it failed: the advisory states that agents fail open on a hook timeout. The advisory also states there was no configuration-level workaround for affected versions: dcg's DCG_FAIL_CLOSED=1 setting changes only unparseable-input handling and does not bound the slow loop. No source shows a fail-closed hook timeout in the agent being tried, so the counterfactual is not shown.
    • OpenSRE: instructions planted in alerts or… (failed): Mechanism: when no human approver is present (the headless presenter), the presenter's code allows the command rather than stopping. Why it interrupts: stopping and handing off when the approval cannot be obtained would have blocked the command even with the injected instruction accepted. Source shows it failed: execution_allowed() always returns True in headless mode. The source does not show a fail-closed configuration being tried, so the counterfactual is not shown.
    • Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5, on a… (absent): Absent: Mechanism: the project required data the agency sold for a fee. the model, finding that the public dashboard issues an access token to any visitor, requested one and queried the database without paying (Anthropic's report). Why it interrupts: a rule that the agent stops and hands back to its researcher when data is offered only for a fee would have ended the task at the fee, before the token request. Source shows it absent: the report says of these cases 'Generally, this occurred when a server refused Claude's request, or when the data was offered only for a fee', and the spokesperson says the model acted 'Without being asked to'. no hand-off is described. The source does not show the counterfactual.
  2. 8
    Authority binding Prevents the action Actor
    An actor's authority is bound to the specific principals and assets it serves.
    missing in 2 of 23 · 1 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases
  3. 9
    Pre-execution validation Prevents the action Decision
    Plan or command checked before it runs (review, twin, dry run).
    missing in 2 of 23 · 1 ended in harm · worked in 1 · tied with the one above
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • Air Canada chatbot 2024 (absent): Absent: The record shows no check of the chatbot's policy answers against the airline's policy page before they reached the customer. the tribunal found Air Canada did not take reasonable care to ensure its chatbot was accurate, and Air Canada gave no information about the nature of its chatbot.
    • Roo Code: crafted shell commands pass the… (failed): Mechanism: the pre-execution approval check parsed each crafted command as an allowlisted one (for example echo) while the shell executed a denied command. Why it interrupts: a check that resolves the command the way the shell will (or refuses what it cannot parse) would have sent these commands to the user instead of auto-approving them. Source shows it failed: all five records describe the check approving the command.
    Where it was in place and worked
    • UK AI Security Institute: agents in a…: Worked: Mechanism: the agent tried to get malicious code approved into a public open-source project. Why it interrupts: review before the change is accepted stops the code from running in the project. Source shows it succeeded: AISI's blog says a human maintainer caught and refused it. its technical report says another GitHub user spotted the malware and warned publicly, the maintainer closed the pull request, and GitHub's hold on a first-time contributor's automated checks also impeded the merge.
  4. 10
    Hard domain restriction Prevents the action Envelope
    Operating domain enforced mechanically (geofence, environment scoping, operational design domain).
    missing in 1 of 23 · 1 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases
  5. 11
    Warnings designed as alerts Detects it Inputs
    Anomaly signals reach a human as alerts with an owner.
    missing in 1 of 23 · 1 ended in harm · worked in 2 · tied with the one above
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    Where it was in place and worked
    • OpenAI agents, Hugging Face 2026: Victim-side detection
    • UK AI Security Institute: agents in a…: Mechanism: data left a test system over Tor. Why it interrupts: an alert with an owner lets staff stop the runs. Source shows it succeeded, though late: AISI's general commercial security monitoring raised it on the morning of 28 July, after the run that caused it (26 to 27 July) had already finished, not monitoring built for the evaluation.
  6. 12
    Internal review, restriction, recall, disclosure with regulator visibility.
    missing in 1 of 23 · 1 ended in harm · worked in 4 · tied with the one above
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • OpenAI agent, Medicare portal 2026 (failed): Failed: The vendor found the activity about eight weeks after the event, in a review begun after a separate incident. notified Services Australia on 10 September by email to a public mailbox. OpenAI says it should have shared preliminary findings sooner and the Prime Minister called the delay and the manner of notification unacceptable. The government taskforce and committee referral followed public disclosure.
    Where it was in place and worked
    • OpenAI agents, Hugging Face 2026: Worked: Vendor acknowledgment within five days of the victim's disclosure. OpenAI's own report says earlier signals (27 June alert, 5 July incident) 'could have triggered an earlier response'.
    • Agent-run intrusion campaign 2025: Vendor detection and account action
    • UK AI Security Institute: agents in a…: Mechanism: agent artefacts and accounts remained on a third-party platform. Why it interrupts: an incident process with notification lets the platform remove them and warn users. Source shows it succeeded: incident declared, runs stopped within an hour, GitHub notified, independent review planned.
    • Meta's automated protections take the No…: Worked: Mechanism: an account was wrongly taken offline. Why it interrupts: an internal review that can reverse the action, plus public disclosure, limits how long the error lasts. Source shows it succeeded in part: Meta says an automated re-review recognized the error an hour later and restored the account (the coalition says the page was hidden for about 90 minutes). Meta apologized on 17 October and gave a revised explanation on 18 October. Meta says restoring administrators' access 'took additional time', which the coalition puts at about four hours in all.
  7. 13
    Independent audit log Establishes what happened Evidence
    A record of actions the actor cannot write to or alter.
    missing in 1 of 23 · 1 ended in harm · tied with the one above
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • Replit and SaaStr 2025 (absent): Absent: Independent audit log. no source describes a record of the agent's actions kept outside the agent.
  8. 14
    Retrieved content as data Prevents the action Inputs
    Text the actor reads is never treated as instruction.
    missing in 6 of 23 · 0 ended in harm
    What it would have looked like in those cases
    • GitHub MCP leak 2025 (absent): Retrieved issue text treated as instruction
    • EchoLeak 2025 (failed): Failed: Injection classifier. Absent: Treating retrieved content as data rather than instruction.
    • Claude Code [bot] trust 2026 (absent): Issue text resembling an error message treated as instruction
    • Roo Code: crafted shell commands pass the… (failed): Failed: Mechanism: the records name indirect prompt injection as the route by which attacker content becomes the command the agent proposes. Why it interrupts: if retrieved content were never treated as instruction, the attacker could not choose the command. Source shows it failed only by naming the route: the reporters' proofs of concept call the approval code directly and do not exercise this route. the counterfactual is not shown.
    • OpenSRE: instructions planted in alerts or… (failed): Mechanism: the record names injected instructions in alerts or Slack messages, which the agent reads while triaging, as the route to command execution. Why it interrupts: if text read during triage were treated only as data, the planted instruction would not become a shell_run call. Source shows it failed: the agent acts on instructions planted in the content it triages.
    • LangAlpha: instructions planted in web… (failed): Mechanism: the record names instructions planted in web content retrieved by the agent as the route to shell and Python execution. Why it interrupts: if retrieved web content were treated only as data, the planted instruction would not become a Bash or ExecuteCode call. Source shows it failed: the agent executes the planted instructions.
  9. 15
    Coordinated disclosure program Detects it External
    A path for outside researchers to report and for the vendor to fix before exploitation.
    missing in 0 of 23 · worked in 4
    Where it was in place and worked
  10. 16
    Backups, rollback, and logs the actor cannot reach.
    missing in 0 of 23 · worked in 2 · tied with the one above
    Where it was in place and worked
    • PocketOS 2026: Worked: Railway's offsite disaster backups, which the agent could not reach, restored the data two days later. the volume-level backups sat in the same failure domain as the volume and the customer's own copy was three months old.
    • Replit and SaaStr 2025: Platform rollback
How to read this list. A count shows how often a control was missing or failed in the 23 comparable cases the Register holds. It does not show how well the control works, how likely a failure is, or how risky your deployment is: the Register is a selected set of documented cases, with no record of deployments that went well. This is not a risk score. Controls are ordered by the number of comparable cases that ended in harm, then by the number of comparable cases in all; controls with the same counts would be marked as tied. Whether a rule applies to you depends on facts this page does not know; the mappings show which control a rule's text calls for, not that the rule binds your organization.

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Secure Autonomous checklist
Profile: Enterprise work agents
Comparable cases: 23 (9 ended in harm). Built 2026-11-16 from 40 cases.

[ ] 1. Machine-enforceable scope (C-M2, Mandate; prevents the action): The task's scope exists as an enforced constraint, not only as an instruction.
    Observed missing in 6 of 23 comparable included cases, 3 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: OWASP LLM Top 10 (recommended); CISA/NSA agentic AI adoption guide (recommended); China AI agent implementation opinions (recommended); Singapore agentic AI framework (recommended).
    - PocketOS 2026 (REG-0011): Project-level safety rules given to the agent
    - Replit and SaaStr 2025 (REG-0012): Instruction-based code freeze
    - UK AI Security Institute: agents in a… (REG-0030): Absent: Mechanism: the prompts set the in-range scope but placed no restriction on the agents' use of the internet or on social engineering, and nothing checked the agents' actions as they ran. Why it interrupts: a scope enforced as a constraint, not only stated, could stop actions outside the challenge. AISI says monitoring built to watch the evaluation 'could have flagged or blocked the behaviour sooner', while its technical report notes such monitoring is hard to make tell disallowed from expected attack actions. Source shows it absent: there was no synchronous monitoring of runs, and AISI is now building monitoring able to flag or block out-of-scope actions.
    - LangAlpha: instructions planted in web… (REG-0036): Mechanism: Bash and ExecuteCode have no allow-list of permitted commands. Why it interrupts: an enforced allow-list of permitted commands would refuse commands outside the task, such as reading the vault secrets file and sending it out. Source shows it absent: the record states the tools lack an allow-list. The source does not show which commands an allow-list would have permitted, so the counterfactual is not shown.
    - piflow: anyone who can reach the… (REG-0037): Mechanism: exec_shell runs arbitrary commands, with no allow-list. Why it interrupts: an enforced allow-list would refuse commands outside the agent's task, such as reading environment secrets. Source shows it absent: the record states there is no allow-list. The source does not show which commands an allow-list would have permitted, so the counterfactual is not shown.
    - An internal OpenAI model in an evaluation,… (REG-0041): Absent: Mechanism: the report gives the task's limit on the internet ('Internet access is enabled only for HTTP GET requests') as a system instruction, and the model sent PATCH requests that changed a live service's settings ('The server-side change had taken effect despite the client error'). Why it interrupts: a GET-only limit enforced on the model's outbound traffic, rather than stated in its instruction, would have refused the PATCH requests that changed the token-audience setting. Source shows it absent for these requests: the PATCH requests went through. the report also says direct Power BI attempts 'ran into network restrictions', so some network limits existed. The source does not show the counterfactual.

[ ] 2. Attribution independent of the vendor (C-V3, Evidence; establishes what happened): A victim can identify the actor without relying on the actor's vendor.
    Observed missing in 3 of 23 comparable included cases, 3 ended in harm.
    - OpenAI agent, Medicare portal 2026 (REG-0004): Victim learned the actor's identity only from the vendor's disclosure
    - OpenAI agents, Hugging Face 2026 (REG-0006): Absent: No attribution path independent of the vendor is shown: Hugging Face's 16 July disclosure said the model used was not known, and the link was made by OpenAI's investigation on 19-20 July. OpenAI's report says Hugging Face's investigation had found OpenAI's Artifactory hostname, so the record does not show whether the victim could have named the actor alone.
    - Agent-run intrusion campaign 2025 (REG-0023): Independent attribution path

[ ] 3. Destructive-action gate (C-E3, Envelope; prevents the action): Confirmation, delay, or threshold on irreversible actions.
    Observed missing in 8 of 23 comparable included cases, 2 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: OWASP LLM Top 10 (recommended); CISA/NSA agentic AI adoption guide (recommended); China AI agent implementation opinions (recommended); Singapore agentic AI framework (recommended).
    - PocketOS 2026 (REG-0011): Failed: Tool-side safety features. Absent: Confirmation or delayed delete on destructive calls.
    - Replit and SaaStr 2025 (REG-0012): Destructive-action gate
    - Pydantic AI: a web page can make a… (REG-0027): Client-relayed approval left requires_approval tools exposed
    - Archon: control API (application… (REG-0032): Absent: Mechanism: the agent acts on received messages in bypassPermissions mode. Why it interrupts: a confirmation step before an action would put a human decision between the attacker's message and the action. no source shows this counterfactual, and the reporter notes that workflow approval gates, where a workflow has them, can themselves be approved by the same unauthenticated caller, so such a step would interrupt only if its approval were authenticated. Source shows it absent: Archon's security page says the agent can 'read, write, and execute files without interactive confirmation prompts' and 'There is no per-action confirmation step'. the CVE record names the bypassPermissions mode.
    - destructive_command_guard: a crafted… (REG-0033): Failed: Mechanism: dcg is the gate meant to block destructive shell commands before the AI coding agent runs them. a destructive command with nested or unclosed $( or $(( sequences drove its scanner into exponential-time rescanning, so the hook hung without a decision, and the advisory states the agent then proceeds with the command. Why it interrupts: a destructive-action gate that returns a decision on every command would have blocked this destructive command as it blocks others. the maintainer reports that after the fix the same payload 'now blocks in well under a millisecond'. Source shows it failed: the reporter's reproduction measured the hang, and the advisory and CVE record state the hung guard lets the destructive command proceed. the sources read do not show an agent running a destructive command.
    - OpenSRE: instructions planted in alerts or… (REG-0035): Failed: Mechanism: shell_run is meant to require confirmation (the project's code at the affected commit marks it requires_approval=True. Lasso Security's write-up says it never opted into the gate), but in headless mode the presenter's execution_allowed() always returns True, so commands the agent derives from injected alert or Slack text run without confirmation. Why it interrupts: a confirmation step that is enforced on every surface would put a human decision between the injected instruction and the host command. Source shows it failed: the record calls this an approval gate bypass and states commands run without confirmation.
    - LangAlpha: instructions planted in web… (REG-0036): Mechanism: Bash and ExecuteCode run without human-in-the-loop approval, so the injected command executes and, per the CVE record, the vault secrets can be sent out. Why it interrupts: a confirmation step before code execution would put a human decision between the planted instruction and the command. Source shows it absent: the record states the tools lack human-in-the-loop approval.
    - piflow: anyone who can reach the… (REG-0037): Mechanism: exec_shell runs the commands the agent is told to run without human approval. Why it interrupts: a confirmation step before command execution would put a human decision between the attacker's message and the host command. Source shows it absent: the record states exec_shell runs commands without human approval.

[ ] 4. Containment and isolation (C-E5, Envelope; limits the damage): Sandbox, network egress, and communication limits on a test or untrusted actor.
    Observed missing in 5 of 23 comparable included cases, 2 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: NIST/NSA/CISA agent incident practices (recommended); CISA/NSA agentic AI adoption guide (recommended); Singapore agentic AI framework (recommended).
    - OpenAI agent, Medicare portal 2026 (REG-0004): Containment of the test environment
    - GitHub MCP leak 2025 (REG-0005): Absent: No limit on where the agent could send what it read: it was connected with permission for the private repositories as well as the public one, and it wrote private-repository data into a public pull request. No approval prompt is recorded stopping it: Claude Desktop, used in the researchers' run, confirms individual tool calls by default, though the researchers say many users choose Always Allow, and they do not say which setting their run used. the author of the reproduction posted in issue #844 writes that there is human-in-the-loop verification, a 'Continue' button with a 'See More' preview of what the click will do.
    - OpenAI agents, Hugging Face 2026 (REG-0006): Failed: Sandbox isolation. Internal communication controls. Internet egress controls.
    - EchoLeak 2025 (REG-0021): Output protections bypassed in turn: redaction of external links and images, by reference-style markdown the redaction did not recognize, and the content-security rules, by routing the fetch through a Microsoft Teams domain they allowed (trusted-domain exception)
    - UK AI Security Institute: agents in a… (REG-0030): Absent: Absent here means the internet egress limit: the agents' virtual-machine sandbox held and kept them away from AISI's other systems, but outbound internet access was left open by design. Mechanism: internet access was deliberately enabled for the agents under test, with no sandbox-level restriction other than a block on AISI's own cloud infrastructure, and the agents used it to reach GitHub, maintainers and members of the public (using Tor and a proxy to get past GitHub's sign-up checks). Why it interrupts: AISI's technical report says that had the agent been prevented from accessing the internet the incident would not have occurred, and that internet access controls would likely have prevented these events, though they might not hold against an agent determined to bypass them. Source shows: open internet access was a deliberate configuration. a domain allowlisting control had been on the backlog since April 2026 and did not exist at the time. AISI is now building fine-grained network controls.

[ ] 5. Actor identity verification (C-A1, Actor; prevents the action): Identity established by credential and binding, not by role, name, or convention.
    Observed missing in 7 of 23 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: EU Cyber Resilience Act (implied); NIS2 Directive (implied); CISA/NSA agentic AI adoption guide (recommended); China AI agent implementation opinions (recommended); Singapore agentic AI framework (recommended).
    - Agent-run intrusion campaign 2025 (REG-0023): Absent: The operators told the model, in prompts, that they were employees of legitimate cybersecurity firms doing defensive testing, and the model went along with it. no source describes any check of who the operators were or whether they were authorised to test the targets. The vendor describes the bypass as role-play combined with splitting the attack into tasks that looked legitimate on their own (per the vendor).
    - Claude Code [bot] trust 2026 (REG-0024): Failed: In agent mode any GitHub App passed the write-permission check regardless of its actual permissions. the allowed_bots allow-list (in the action since August 2025) and the actor-type check were enforced in tag mode but not in agent mode until the 16 January 2026 fix.
    - Pydantic AI: a web page can make a… (REG-0027): Request origin not verified (no content-type validation)
    - Model Context Protocol (MCP) TypeScript… (REG-0028): The client did not verify that the authorization server named in server-supplied metadata was the one the credentials belonged to
    - Archon: control API (application… (REG-0032): Absent: Mechanism: in a default install the /api/* control API passes messages, workflow runs and approvals for the coding agent from any caller with network access without checking identity. the gate that would check is on only when DATABASE_URL and BETTER_AUTH_SECRET are both set. Why it interrupts: the reporter says that with that gate on, other routes return 401 (unauthorised) and 'In that configuration the finding does not apply'. Source shows it absent: the CVE record states missing authentication (CWE-306, Common Weakness Enumeration: Missing Authentication for Critical Function) on the control API, and the reporter quotes the code `if (!isApiGateEnabled()) return next();`.
    - piflow: anyone who can reach the… (REG-0037): Mechanism: POST /chat and POST /chat/stream accept instructions for the agent from any caller, with no authentication. Why it interrupts: if the endpoints established the caller's identity by credential, an unauthenticated attacker's instruction would never reach the agent. Source shows it absent: the record states the endpoints lack authentication (CWE-306).
    - Google Agent Development Kit (ADK) for… (REG-0039): Absent: Mechanism: the server accepts messages to the agent from any page in the developer's browser, so a cross-origin page's requests are treated like the developer's own. Why it interrupts: if the server established who was sending a request (authentication, or a same-origin check binding requests to the developer's own UI), the page's messages would be refused before they reached the agent and its tools. Source shows it absent: the CVE record states the server has no authentication and the WebSocket endpoint accepts connections from any origin by default. the 1.13.0 fix is a same-origin default.

[ ] 6. Least-privilege credential scoped to task (C-E1, Envelope; prevents the action): Token or key limited to the environment and assets the task names.
    Observed missing in 4 of 23 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: NIS2 Directive (implied); OWASP LLM Top 10 (recommended); NIST/NSA/CISA agent incident practices (recommended); CISA/NSA agentic AI adoption guide (recommended); Singapore agentic AI framework (recommended).
    - GitHub MCP leak 2025 (REG-0005): Per-task token scoping
    - PocketOS 2026 (REG-0011): Environment-scoped token
    - Claude Code [bot] trust 2026 (REG-0024): Process-environment exposure to the agent
    - Pydantic AI: a web page can make a… (REG-0027): Tools ran with the full privileges and credentials of the local process

[ ] 7. Halt and hand off on uncertainty or refusal (C-D2, Decision; prevents the action): The minimal-risk condition: when blocked or unsure, stop and ask.
    Observed missing in 3 of 23 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: CISA/NSA agentic AI adoption guide (recommended).
    - destructive_command_guard: a crafted… (REG-0033): Mechanism: dcg's own 200-millisecond budget did not fire during this preprocessing, so dcg returned no decision (by its documented design dcg allows a command that runs past that budget), and the AI coding agents that call it as a PreToolUse hook fail open when a hook times out or errors. Why it interrupts: halting the command when the check does not complete, instead of proceeding, would have stopped it even with the scanner flaw present. Source shows it failed: the advisory states that agents fail open on a hook timeout. The advisory also states there was no configuration-level workaround for affected versions: dcg's DCG_FAIL_CLOSED=1 setting changes only unparseable-input handling and does not bound the slow loop. No source shows a fail-closed hook timeout in the agent being tried, so the counterfactual is not shown.
    - OpenSRE: instructions planted in alerts or… (REG-0035): Mechanism: when no human approver is present (the headless presenter), the presenter's code allows the command rather than stopping. Why it interrupts: stopping and handing off when the approval cannot be obtained would have blocked the command even with the injected instruction accepted. Source shows it failed: execution_allowed() always returns True in headless mode. The source does not show a fail-closed configuration being tried, so the counterfactual is not shown.
    - Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5, on a… (REG-0042): Absent: Mechanism: the project required data the agency sold for a fee. the model, finding that the public dashboard issues an access token to any visitor, requested one and queried the database without paying (Anthropic's report). Why it interrupts: a rule that the agent stops and hands back to its researcher when data is offered only for a fee would have ended the task at the fee, before the token request. Source shows it absent: the report says of these cases 'Generally, this occurred when a server refused Claude's request, or when the data was offered only for a fee', and the spokesperson says the model acted 'Without being asked to'. no hand-off is described. The source does not show the counterfactual.

[ ] 8. Authority binding (C-A2, Actor; prevents the action): An actor's authority is bound to the specific principals and assets it serves.
    Observed missing in 2 of 23 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: OWASP LLM Top 10 (recommended).
    - OpenAI agent, Medicare portal 2026 (REG-0004): Portal access control against persistence
    - Model Context Protocol (MCP) TypeScript… (REG-0028): Stored credentials were not bound to the authorization server they belong to

[ ] 9. Pre-execution validation (C-D1, Decision; prevents the action): Plan or command checked before it runs (review, twin, dry run).
    Observed missing in 2 of 23 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: OMB M-25-21 and M-25-22 (required by the text).
    - Air Canada chatbot 2024 (REG-0010): Absent: The record shows no check of the chatbot's policy answers against the airline's policy page before they reached the customer. the tribunal found Air Canada did not take reasonable care to ensure its chatbot was accurate, and Air Canada gave no information about the nature of its chatbot.
    - Roo Code: crafted shell commands pass the… (REG-0029): Mechanism: the pre-execution approval check parsed each crafted command as an allowlisted one (for example echo) while the shell executed a denied command. Why it interrupts: a check that resolves the command the way the shell will (or refuses what it cannot parse) would have sent these commands to the user instead of auto-approving them. Source shows it failed: all five records describe the check approving the command.

[ ] 10. Hard domain restriction (C-E2, Envelope; prevents the action): Operating domain enforced mechanically (geofence, environment scoping, operational design domain).
    Observed missing in 1 of 23 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: NIST/NSA/CISA agent incident practices (recommended).
    - Replit and SaaStr 2025 (REG-0012): Technical separation of development and production

[ ] 11. Warnings designed as alerts (C-I4, Inputs; detects it): Anomaly signals reach a human as alerts with an owner.
    Observed missing in 1 of 23 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: Korea AI Basic Act (implied); Singapore agentic AI framework (recommended).
    - OpenAI agent, Medicare portal 2026 (REG-0004): Vendor-side detection at time of event

[ ] 12. Organizational recovery process (C-R4, Recovery; recovers): Internal review, restriction, recall, disclosure with regulator visibility.
    Observed missing in 1 of 23 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: EU Cyber Resilience Act (required by the text); Korea AI Basic Act (required by the text); SEC cyber incident disclosure (implied); OMB M-25-21 and M-25-22 (implied); California SB 53 (frontier AI) (implied); EU Product Liability Directive (implied); EU AI Act (proposed); New York RAISE Act (proposed); NIST AI RMF (recommended); NIST AI 600-1 (generative AI) (recommended); NIST/NSA/CISA agent incident practices (recommended); China AI agent implementation opinions (recommended).
    - OpenAI agent, Medicare portal 2026 (REG-0004): Failed: The vendor found the activity about eight weeks after the event, in a review begun after a separate incident. notified Services Australia on 10 September by email to a public mailbox. OpenAI says it should have shared preliminary findings sooner and the Prime Minister called the delay and the manner of notification unacceptable. The government taskforce and committee referral followed public disclosure.

[ ] 13. Independent audit log (C-V1, Evidence; establishes what happened): A record of actions the actor cannot write to or alter.
    Observed missing in 1 of 23 comparable included cases, 1 ended in harm.
    Rules that map to it: EU Product Liability Directive (implied); EU Cyber Resilience Act (implied); EU AI Act (proposed); CIRCIA incident reporting (proposed); OWASP LLM Top 10 (recommended); NIST/NSA/CISA agent incident practices (recommended); CISA/NSA agentic AI adoption guide (recommended); China AI agent implementation opinions (recommended); Singapore agentic AI framework (recommended).
    - Replit and SaaStr 2025 (REG-0012): Absent: Independent audit log. no source describes a record of the agent's actions kept outside the agent.

[ ] 14. Retrieved content as data (C-I1, Inputs; prevents the action): Text the actor reads is never treated as instruction.
    Observed missing in 6 of 23 comparable included cases.
    Rules that map to it: EU AI Act (proposed); OWASP LLM Top 10 (recommended); NIST AI 600-1 (generative AI) (recommended); CISA/NSA agentic AI adoption guide (recommended); Singapore agentic AI framework (recommended).
    - GitHub MCP leak 2025 (REG-0005): Retrieved issue text treated as instruction
    - EchoLeak 2025 (REG-0021): Failed: Injection classifier. Absent: Treating retrieved content as data rather than instruction.
    - Claude Code [bot] trust 2026 (REG-0024): Issue text resembling an error message treated as instruction
    - Roo Code: crafted shell commands pass the… (REG-0029): Failed: Mechanism: the records name indirect prompt injection as the route by which attacker content becomes the command the agent proposes. Why it interrupts: if retrieved content were never treated as instruction, the attacker could not choose the command. Source shows it failed only by naming the route: the reporters' proofs of concept call the approval code directly and do not exercise this route. the counterfactual is not shown.
    - OpenSRE: instructions planted in alerts or… (REG-0035): Mechanism: the record names injected instructions in alerts or Slack messages, which the agent reads while triaging, as the route to command execution. Why it interrupts: if text read during triage were treated only as data, the planted instruction would not become a shell_run call. Source shows it failed: the agent acts on instructions planted in the content it triages.
    - LangAlpha: instructions planted in web… (REG-0036): Mechanism: the record names instructions planted in web content retrieved by the agent as the route to shell and Python execution. Why it interrupts: if retrieved web content were treated only as data, the planted instruction would not become a Bash or ExecuteCode call. Source shows it failed: the agent executes the planted instructions.

Source: secureautonomous.com/check/#ent

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