Controls › C-R2
Automated fail-safe
Safe stop or degradation the system performs itself.
Recovery layerMissing or failed in 2 cases (2 ended in harm)Worked in 2Machines: 2
Where it was missing or failed
The third column is what this control would have looked like in that case: the concrete form, not the abstract name.
| Case | World | What it would have looked like here | Status | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uber ATG, Tempe 2018 | Machines | Automated emergency braking under computer control: the system was not designed to brake beyond its 0.71 g cap or to brake hard only to lessen an unavoidable impact, and Volvo's automatic emergency braking was switched off | absent | Ended in harm |
| Cruise 2023 | Machines | Post-collision behavior logic | failed | Ended in harm |
Where it worked
| Case | World | What it looked like | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zoox smoke scene 2026 | Machines | Safe stop | Stopped by the operator's control |
| Triton 2017 | Machines | Fail-safe shutdown, twice (by design; set off by faults in the attacker's code, which FireEye assessed at moderate confidence were unintended) | Stopped by the operator's control |
Rules and standards that map to it
Strength says whether the rule's text requires this control, implies it, or only recommends it. Draft mappings are the Register's reading, not yet checked by a person, and none is legal advice.
| Rule | Strength | Where, and why | Jurisdiction |
|---|---|---|---|
| FMVSS No. 127: automatic emergency braking systems for light vehicles (49 CFR 571.127) (draft mapping) | Required by the text | the vehicle must brake on its own to avoid the collision when the driver does not | United States |
| Texas authorization for automated motor vehicles in commercial service (SB 2807; Transportation Code ch. 545, subch. J) (draft mapping) | Required by the text | the vehicle must be able to achieve a minimal risk condition if the automated driving system fails | Texas, United States |
| FAA proposed rule: normalizing beyond visual line of sight drone operations (proposed 14 CFR part 108) (draft mapping) | Proposed | no single power or propulsion failure may cause loss of flight control | United States |
| IEC 61511: functional safety of safety instrumented systems for the process industry (draft mapping) | Recommended | the safety instrumented system is the automated fail-safe (Triton: the plant tripped) | International standard |
Deploying something? Check a deployment ranks every control against the cases that match your profile. Patterns shows where this control fails across worlds.