Controls › C-R3
Human takeover with a time window
Teleoperation, holding periods, delays that give a human time.
Recovery layerMissing or failed in 2 cases (2 ended in harm)Worked in 2Machines: 2
Where it was missing or failed
The third column is what this control would have looked like in that case: the concrete form, not the abstract name.
| Case | World | What it would have looked like here | Status | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uber ATG, Tempe 2018 | Machines | Operator takeover as the primary emergency safeguard: the one-second braking suppression allowed time for the operator to take control, but no alert was given when it began. Second operator in vehicle (absent: Uber moved to a single operator in September to October 2017) | failed | Ended in harm |
| Boeing 737 MAX MCAS | Machines | Crew recovery on the Lion Air flight the day before: after a jump-seat pilot noted the dive, the Captain cut out the stabilizer trim (one occurrence). On Ethiopian 302 the crew also cut out the trim, could not trim manually, and returned the switches to normal about two and a half minutes later, before the fourth activation | failed | Ended in harm |
Where it worked
| Case | World | What it looked like | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zoox smoke scene 2026 | Machines | Remote teleguidance: the vehicle reversed under a teleguidance tactician's guidance; no timing is disclosed, and the filing does not say whether the person took over driving | Stopped by the operator's control |
| The DAO 2016 | Agents moving money | Holding period (delay before irreversibility); Community-level override | Ended in harm |
Rules and standards that map to it
Strength says whether the rule's text requires this control, implies it, or only recommends it. Draft mappings are the Register's reading, not yet checked by a person, and none is legal advice.
| Rule | Strength | Where, and why | Jurisdiction |
|---|---|---|---|
| California DMV autonomous vehicle regulations (13 CCR §§ 227–228, revised April 2026) and AB 1777 (draft mapping) | Required by the text | two-way communication with first responders answered within 30 seconds, and remote drivers and assistants licensed and trained | California, United States |
| EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), high-risk obligations (draft mapping) | Required by the text | Article 14: human oversight with the ability to intervene, interrupt, or stop | European Union |
| 14 CFR 25.1309: equipment, systems, and installations (transport aircraft certification) (draft mapping) | Implied | the crew must be able to take corrective action within the time available | United States |
| OMB memoranda M-25-21 and M-25-22: federal use and acquisition of AI (draft mapping) | Implied | M-25-21: human oversight, intervention, and remedies or appeals for affected individuals | United States (federal agencies and their AI vendors) |
| FINRA 2026 Annual Regulatory Oversight Report: generative AI and AI agents (draft mapping) | Recommended | deciding where human-in-the-loop review is required before an agent's action stands | United States (broker-dealers) |
Deploying something? Check a deployment ranks every control against the cases that match your profile. Patterns shows where this control fails across worlds.