Mobley v. Workday: a court allows the claim that a screening vendor acts as the employers' agent, 2024 to 2026

Changes to what this case says, with the reason. Every earlier version is kept.

• 2026-10-20: Sources: ndcal: checked; sources: ndcal-may25: checked; sources: eeoc: checked. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: dkt. 80, dkt. 128 and the eeoc brief (dkt. 60-1) re-opened in full at their linked urls; titles, dates, docket numbers and types match the documents.
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  Before: 2026-10-13

  After: 2026-10-20
• 2026-10-20: Inference: signed by, inference: signed on. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: the interpretation's wording changed in this re-check (see the inference.value entry of this date), so the editor's signature of 19 october 2026 no longer covers it; the editor must sign the new wording.
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  Before: {"signed_by": "Saurabh Bhatnagar", "signed_on": "2026-10-19"}

  After: {"signed_by": null, "signed_on": null}
• 2026-10-20: Inference: source ids. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: the new wording rests also on the 13 july 2026 order (ndcal-jul26, class-certification hearing set for 9 march 2027, so the claims are pending) and on lawyer monthly (lawyermonthly: 'no finding has been made ...'; 'the company continues to contest the claims').
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  Before: ["NDCAL"]

  After: ["NDCAL", "NDCAL-JUL26", "LAWYERMONTHLY"]
• 2026-10-20: Inference: value. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: dkt. 80 (ndcal) states 'employers cannot escape liability for discrimination by delegating their traditional functions, like hiring, to a third party' as existing law (citing manhart) and decides nothing about any employer, since workday is the only defendant; it holds the agency claim plausibly alleged and says the statutes do not distinguish 'between delegating functions to an automated agent versus a live human one'. no source finds that the tools discriminate (lawyer monthly, lawyermonthly: 'no finding has been made that workday's technology discriminates'). the air canada cross-reference now names its register entry. the editor signed the earlier wording on 19 october 2026; signed_by and signed_on are cleared so the editor can sign the new wording.
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  Before: Read with the Air Canada case, this one suggests a working rule: delegating to a system does not move responsibility off the company that delegated, and May extend it to the vendor that performs the function. The claim against the vendor is still pending

  After: Read with the Air Canada case (REG-0010), this one suggests a working rule: delegating to a system does not move responsibility off the company that delegated, and May extend it to the vendor that performs the function. The court stated the first part as existing law, since no employer is a party, and at the pleading stage allowed the claim that the vendor is the employers' agent, whether software or a person does the screening. There is no finding that the tools discriminate; the vendor contests the claims, which are still pending
• 2026-10-20: Unmapped[c-d1]. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: the 13 july 2026 order (ndcal-jul26, findlaw copy) says 'workday recently produced three bias evaluation reports that describe the company's internal analysis' of 'a random sampling of applicant data', and that they 'appear relevant to pivotal issues about alleged bias'; it does not state their findings.
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  Before: C-D1 (bias testing of the screening): alleged in a pending lawsuit, not established; not counted as a missing control until a court rules

  After: C-D1 (bias testing of the screening): alleged in a pending lawsuit, not established; not counted as a missing control until a court rules. A court order of 13 July 2026 records that Workday produced three bias evaluation reports in discovery, describing its internal analysis of sampled applicant data; the order does not say what they found
• 2026-10-20: Fields: recovery accountability. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: dkt. 80 (ndcal) p. 11: 'this order does not reach mobley's alternative argument that workday is an "employer" under an indirect employer theory'; p. 20: the motion is 'granted with leave to amend as to the feha claim' (california's fair employment and housing act aiding-and-abetting claim).
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  Before: In July 2024 the court held the plaintiff had plausibly alleged that Workday acted as the employers' agent, performing a function employers traditionally perform; it dismissed the employment-agency theory and the intentional-discrimination claims, leaving the agent theory and the disparate-impact claims

  After: In July 2024 the court held the plaintiff had plausibly alleged that Workday acted as the employers' agent, performing a function employers traditionally perform; it dismissed the employment-agency theory and the intentional-discrimination claims, leaving the agent theory and the disparate-impact claims; it did not reach the indirect-employer theory, and dismissed the state-law aiding-and-abetting claim with leave to amend
• 2026-10-20: Fields: evidence event. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: the brief (eeoc, dkt. 60-1) argues three theories under headings iv.a-c ('employment agency', 'indirect employer', 'agent of employers') and 'takes no position on the accuracy of the allegations' (p. 1); dkt. 80 (ndcal) accepts only the agency theory, dismisses the employment-agency theory without leave to amend and 'does not reach' the indirect-employer theory. the field had presented the brief as backing only the theory that succeeded.
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  Before: Court orders; the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed an amicus brief supporting the theory that a vendor can be liable as the employer's agent

  After: Court orders; the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's friend-of-the-court (amicus) brief of 9 April 2024 argued Workday could be covered as an employment agency, an indirect employer, or an agent of employers, and took no position on the accuracy of the allegations; the court accepted the agent theory, rejected the employment-agency theory and did not reach the indirect-employer theory
• 2026-10-20: Fields: outcome. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: dkt. 158 (ndcal-jul25, 29 july 2025): 'the scope of the collective, at the preliminary certification stage, includes individuals whose applications were scored, sorted, ranked, or screened using hiredscore ai features.'.
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  Before: {"value": "State: alleged harm. Preliminary collective certification in May 2025 of the age-discrimination claim, for applicants aged 40 and over who applied through Workday's platform since 24 September 2020 and were denied recommendations; the merits are untested.", "source_ids": ["NDCAL-MAY25"]}

  After: {"value": "State: alleged harm. Preliminary collective certification in May 2025 of the age-discrimination claim, for applicants aged 40 and over who applied through Workday's platform since 24 September 2020 and were denied recommendations; in July 2025 the court held that, at this preliminary stage, the collective also includes applicants scored, sorted, ranked or screened with Workday's HiredScore features; the merits are untested.", "source_ids": ["NDCAL-MAY25", "NDCAL-JUL25"]}
• 2026-10-20: Fields: decision. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: dkt. 267 (ndcal-mar26) says the court on 6 january 2026 granted leave 'to add claims for gender-based discrimination under title vii' and that the complaint alleges statistical evidence of disparate impact 'on the basis of race and gender'.
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  Before: {"value": "Alleged disparate impact by age, race, and disability in the screening", "source_ids": ["NDCAL"]}

  After: {"value": "Alleged disparate impact by age, race, and disability in the screening; since January 2026 the amended complaint also alleges disparate impact by gender", "source_ids": ["NDCAL", "NDCAL-MAR26"]}
• 2026-10-20: Outcome: as of. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: the latest record read is lawyer monthly of 21 september 2026 (lawyermonthly); a web search on 20 october 2026 found no later ruling, settlement or trial date.
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  Before: May 2025

  After: September 2026
• 2026-10-20: Outcome: regime consequence. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: the entry stopped at may 2025. dkt. 158 (ndcal-jul25) holds that the collective 'includes individuals whose applications were scored, sorted, ranked, or screened using hiredscore ai features'; the 13 july 2026 order (ndcal-jul26) sets the class-certification hearing for 9 march 2027; lawyer monthly (lawyermonthly) reports the motion and that 'no finding has been made that workday's technology discriminates'.
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  Before: preliminary collective certification (May 2025)

  After: preliminary collective certification of the age-discrimination claim (May 2025); collective confirmed to include applicants screened with HiredScore artificial intelligence features (July 2025); class-certification motion reported in September 2026, hearing set for 9 March 2027; no ruling on the merits
• 2026-10-20: Outcome: affected parties. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: dkt. 128 (ndcal-may25) certifies 'individuals aged 40 and over', not 'over 40'; lawyer monthly (lawyermonthly, 21 september 2026) reports a class-certification motion with 'four proposed subclasses covering african american applicants, women, people aged over 40 and applicants with disabilities'.
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  Before: ["applicants over 40 (collective)"]

  After: ["applicants aged 40 and over (age-discrimination collective, preliminarily certified)", "proposed subclasses of African American applicants, women, applicants over 40 and applicants with disabilities (class-certification motion pending, as reported)"]
• 2026-10-20: Applicable rules. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: no cited source mentions a state automated-decision law; the state-law claim pleaded is under california's fair employment and housing act (dkt. 80, ndcal, p. 3; dkt. 267, ndcal-mar26, p. 1). the automated-decision entry is kept as a pointer and marked as not pleaded.
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  Before: ["Age Discrimination in Employment Act; Title VII; Americans with Disabilities Act; state automated-decision laws"]

  After: ["Age Discrimination in Employment Act; Title VII; Americans with Disabilities Act; California Fair Employment and Housing Act (pleaded); state automated-decision laws (none appears among the claims in the court orders)"]
• 2026-10-20: Context: autonomy level text. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: 'employers act on the output' left out the plaintiffs' account: dkt. 128 (ndcal-may25) defines a denied recommendation to include 'an automatic rejection by workday', and dkt. 80 (ndcal) quotes workday's website on 'automatically dispositioning' candidates. dkt. 128 also records workday's declaration that customers may 'enable, disable, use, or ignore its many features' and workday's position that its system 'cannot auto-reject applicants without some degree of participation by the employer'. both accounts are now stated.
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  Before: Machine screens and ranks; employers act on the output

  After: Machine scores, sorts, ranks or screens applicants and reports results to the employer; employers choose which artificial intelligence features to turn on. The plaintiffs allege some rejections were automatic; Workday's position, as the court describes it, is that its system cannot reject an applicant without some participation by the employer
• 2026-10-20: Context: domain. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: abbreviation 'llm' spelled out under the plain-language rule; the orders (dkt. 80, ndcal; dkt. 128, ndcal-may25) describe tools that embed 'artificial intelligence' and 'machine learning', and none describes a large language model.
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  Before: Automated decision system (hiring screens); boundary case: older automation, not an LLM agent

  After: Automated decision system (hiring screens); boundary case: older automation, not an agent built on a large language model
• 2026-10-20: Title. Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 october 2026: the case did not stop in 2025: the court ruled again on 29 july 2025 (dkt. 158, ndcal-jul25), 6 march 2026 (dkt. 267, ndcal-mar26) and 13 july 2026 (ndcal-jul26), and the claims are still pending.
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  Before: Mobley v. Workday: a court allows the claim that a screening vendor acts as the employers' agent, 2024 to 2025

  After: Mobley v. Workday: a court allows the claim that a screening vendor acts as the employers' agent, 2024 to 2026
• 2026-10-16: Controls: c-d1. Found in an outside review of the published record on 16 october 2026: the only basis is an allegation in a pending case, so it should not be counted as a failed control.
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  Before: failed: Bias testing of screening (alleged)

  After: not counted: C-D1 (bias testing of the screening): alleged in a pending lawsuit, not established; not counted as a missing control until a court rules
• 2026-10-14: Controls. Verifier rule 10: litigation is an accountability route, not a control that interrupts the mechanism; no linked source shows an applicant-facing explanation was absent.
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  Before: succeeded candidate 'Litigation as a discovery mechanism'; absent candidate 'Applicant-facing explanation of automated rejection'

  After: removed
• 2026-10-14: Outcome: regime consequence. The may 2025 order granted preliminary, not conditional, certification; matches the outcome claim.
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  Before: collective conditionally certified

  After: preliminary collective certification (May 2025)
• 2026-10-13: Fields. Independent check against the linked records before right-of-reply letters.
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  Before: 'over forty'; status 'as of Oct 2026' on a May 2025 order; objective typed fact; title 'the vendor's screening system'

  After: class definition as the order states it; status dated to the order; objective typed as alleged; title names the vendor
• 2026-10-13: Fields and sources. Claims aligned to what each linked record says, found on review.
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  Before: collective 'conditionally certified'; July 2024 ruling described without the dismissed theories; status as of 2025

  After: 'preliminary' certification as the order states; dismissed theories recorded; EEOC brief and May 2025 order linked; status refreshed