Controls › C-I4
Warnings designed as alerts
Anomaly signals reach a human as alerts with an owner.
Inputs layerMissing or failed in 4 cases (3 ended in harm)Worked in 1Machines: 2Software agents: 1Agents moving money: 1
Where it was missing or failed
The third column is what this control would have looked like in that case: the concrete form, not the abstract name.
| Case | World | What it would have looked like here | Status | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Uber ATG, Tempe 2018 | Machines | Operator alerting on detected hazard: no alert when the system detected the emergency 1.2 seconds before impact; an auditory alert came 0.2 seconds before impact | failed | Ended in harm |
| OpenAI agent, Medicare portal 2026 | Software agents | Vendor-side detection at time of event | absent | Ended in harm |
| Knight Capital 2012 | Agents moving money | Alerting design (SEC order, paragraph 19: the 97 'Power Peg disabled' emails were not designed as system alerts and were generally not reviewed; paragraph 41: integrating these reject messages into monitoring 'could have prevented the events of August 1') | failed | Ended in harm |
| Kia dealer portal 2024 | Machines | Owner notification on access changes: the researchers write that, from the victim's side, there was no notification that the vehicle had been accessed or its access permissions modified | absent | Caught first by researchers |
Where it worked
| Case | World | What it looked like | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| OpenAI agents, Hugging Face 2026 | Software agents | Victim-side detection | Ended in harm |
Rules and standards that map to it
Strength says whether the rule's text requires this control, implies it, or only recommends it. Draft mappings are the Register's reading, not yet checked by a person, and none is legal advice.
| Rule | Strength | Where, and why | Jurisdiction |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14 CFR 25.1309: equipment, systems, and installations (transport aircraft certification) (draft mapping) | Required by the text | warning information adequate for the crew to act | United States |
| FMVSS No. 127: automatic emergency braking systems for light vehicles (49 CFR 571.127) (draft mapping) | Required by the text | forward collision warning to the driver before automatic braking | United States |
| TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series: cybersecurity of pipeline and LNG control systems (draft mapping) | Implied | continuous monitoring and detection that surfaces and corrects anomalies | United States (designated pipeline and LNG operators) |
| FAA proposed rule: normalizing beyond visual line of sight drone operations (proposed 14 CFR part 108) (draft mapping) | Proposed | conformance monitoring that compares the flight with the declared operational intent and alerts the operator | United States |
Deploying something? Check a deployment ranks every control against the cases that match your profile. Patterns shows where this control fails across worlds.