Two autonomous haul trucks, stopped and in exception mode, resume autonomous operation and drive forward as two operators move to board them, after a nearby vehicle is deactivated and removes the safety bubble holding them; near miss reported by the Western Australian mines safety regulator, report dated 24 May 2021
The typed evidence object. This is the working store; the case page is the reader's form.
| Layer / facet | Value | Type | Sources | Conf. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mandate: principal | not evidenced in source: the report does not name the mine, its operator or the party that directed the trucks' work | assertion | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | low |
| Mandate: objective | not evidenced in source: the report does not state the trucks' assigned route or task at the time | assertion | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | low |
| Actor | Two autonomous haul trucks (AHTs) under an autonomous haulage system (AHS). The report does not name the manufacturer, the model or the system's supplier | fact | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | high |
| Inputs | 'The failure of a communications trailer providing wireless coverage for the autonomous haulage system (AHS) caused a reduction in network coverage. As a result, the two AHTs came to a stop as per protocol for loss of communications.' 'It was later determined that the two AHTs had not lost communication, but had stopped due to other vehicles nearby losing communications.' Contributory cause: 'Limited redundancy in communications network utilised by the AHS' | fact | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | high |
| Decision | 'While the operators were near the trucks and moving to board, the last vehicle that had lost communications was deactivated, removing the safety bubble holding the AHTs, which were in exception mode. The AHTs reverted to their last command and resumed autonomous operation.' Direct cause: 'Once the light vehicles in the area were deactivated, which removed the projected safety bubble, the AHTs reverted from exception to autonomous mode allowing them to resume operations' | fact | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | high |
| Envelope: constraints | Contributory causes: 'AHTs were in exception mode and not suspended (unsafe mode to approach)'; 'Ability for personnel to override system functions that are designed as critical safety controls'; 'AHTs did not detect a person about to board'; 'Lack of understanding or clarity regarding the actions of the AHTs in various modes of operation'. Instructions had been given to deactivate vehicles in the area 'due to the belief that all AHTs were unable to resume autonomous operations' | fact | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | high |
| Action | The two trucks 'unexpectedly drove forward', 'activating two blasts of the horn to signal commencement of forward movement'. 'On hearing the warning, the operators took evasive action, with one entering the AHT cab and taking control, while the other moved out of the path of the second AHT as it drove past.' The report gives no incident date, time, speed or distance | fact | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | high |
| Outcome | 'Two operators were exposed to potentially serious injury when the two autonomous haul trucks (AHTs) they were attempting to board unexpectedly drove forward.' The report is titled a near miss and describes no injury or damage | fact | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | high |
| Evidence | Significant Incident Report No. 286, 'Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations', dated 24 May 2021 and 'approved for release by the State Mining Engineer on 24 May 2021'; published on WorkSafe WA's site (page published 07 March 2025, last updated 10 March 2025). Direct causes also include 'Operators attempted to board the AHTs while they were not under their control' and 'The operators did not identify that the AHTs were in exception mode when attempting to board'; contributory causes also include 'Operators did not observe the AHTs status mode indicator lights' and 'Previous AHS communication issues may have desensitised the operators to potential hazards' | fact | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF; Mines Safety Significant Incident Report No. 286 Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (WorkSafe WA publication page; published 07 March 2025, last updated 10 March 2025) | high |
| Recovery: technical | Actions required by the report: review procedures for boarding an AHT so that safe systems of work are based on original equipment manufacturer recommendations; training and assessment programs ensure competence, with task observations; 'conditions are risk assessed if personnel are permitted to manually override safety controls'; 'safe states in which AHTs can be approached are clearly defined and recognisable in the field'; 'robust communication networks are in place'; and 'tele-remote operation or follow me operation for moving AHTs is considered'. The report does not say what the mine itself changed | fact | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | high |
| Recovery: accountability | not evidenced in source: the report names no mine, operator or manufacturer and records no prosecution, fine or allocation of responsibility | assertion | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | low |
Controls
| Status | Control | Canonical |
|---|---|---|
| failed | Mechanism: per the report, the trucks were 'in exception mode and not suspended (unsafe mode to approach)', so when the safety bubble was removed they resumed autonomous operation, and they 'did not detect a person about to board'. Why it interrupts: a stop state for approach (suspension) or presence detection at the truck would have kept the trucks from moving toward people boarding them, independently of the communications bubble that was removed. Source shows it failed: the projected safety bubble holding the trucks was removed by the deactivation, the trucks were not suspended, the state the report calls safe to approach, and they did not detect a person about to board; it does not say whether a person-detection function was fitted. The report's action is that 'safe states in which AHTs can be approached are clearly defined'. The source does not run the counterfactual. | C-E4 Physical safety interlock |
| succeeded | Mechanism: per the report, the trucks signalled commencement of forward movement with two blasts of the horn, and 'on hearing the warning, the operators took evasive action, with one entering the AHT cab and taking control, while the other moved out of the path'. Why it interrupts: a warning at the start of movement lets people nearby act before the truck reaches them, and the report records that the operators acted on hearing it. Source shows it operated. The source shows no delay between the horn and the movement (the horn signalled 'commencement of forward movement'), so how much time the warning gave is not shown. | candidate, awaiting taxonomy decision |
| absent | Mechanism: per the report, instructions were given to deactivate vehicles in the area 'due to the belief that all AHTs were unable to resume autonomous operations', and a contributory cause was 'lack of understanding or clarity regarding the actions of the AHTs in various modes of operation'. Why it interrupts: if the people directing the recovery had known that trucks in exception mode would resume their last command once the bubble was removed, the deactivation and the approach would not have rested on that belief. Source shows the understanding absent. The report does not run the counterfactual. | C-M1 Mandate disclosed to supervisor |
Unmapped
- Redundant communications (no canonical control fits): the report lists 'limited redundancy in communications network utilised by the AHS' as a contributory cause and requires robust communication networks
- Personnel override of critical safety controls (no canonical control fits exactly): the report lists the 'ability for personnel to override system functions that are designed as critical safety controls' as a contributory cause, but does not say which function was overridden in this event, so no control state is recorded
- Status indicators (C-I4): the report says the operators did not observe the trucks' status mode indicator lights; the lights existed, and the report does not say whether they were designed as alerts with an owner, so no control state is recorded
Inference
inference The Western Australian mines safety regulator's report says two autonomous haul trucks, stopped in exception mode because nearby vehicles had lost communications, resumed their last command and drove forward as two operators moved to board them, once the last such vehicle was deactivated and the safety bubble holding the trucks was removed; the operators took evasive action after a two-blast horn warning. Among the causes the report lists are that the trucks were in exception mode and not suspended, a lack of clarity about how the trucks behave in each mode, and that the trucks did not detect a person about to board. The record does not give the incident date, name the mine, the operator or the system's manufacturer, or say what the mine changed afterwards.
Sources
| ID | Record | Type | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| WA_SIR286_PDF | Significant Incident Report No. 286: Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (Western Australian mines safety regulator; approved for release by the State Mining Engineer, 24 May 2021), PDF | regulator primary record | worksafe.wa.gov.au ↗ checked 2026-11-15 |
| WA_SIR286_PAGE | Mines Safety Significant Incident Report No. 286 Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations (WorkSafe WA publication page; published 07 March 2025, last updated 10 March 2025) | regulator primary record | worksafe.wa.gov.au ↗ checked 2026-11-15 |