Two autonomous haul trucks, stopped and in exception mode, resume autonomous operation and drive forward as two operators move to board them, after a nearby vehicle is deactivated and removes the safety bubble holding them; near miss reported by the Western Australian mines safety regulator, report dated 24 May 2021
What happened
not evidenced in source: the report does not name the mine, its operator or the party that directed the trucks' work. Two autonomous haul trucks (AHTs) under an autonomous haulage system (AHS). The report does not name the manufacturer, the model or the system's supplier. 'The failure of a communications trailer providing wireless coverage for the autonomous haulage system (AHS) caused a reduction in network coverage. As a result, the two AHTs came to a stop as per protocol for loss of communications.' 'It was later determined that the two AHTs had not lost communication, but had stopped due to other vehicles nearby losing communications.' Contributory cause: 'Limited redundancy in communications network utilised by the AHS'. 'While the operators were near the trucks and moving to board, the last vehicle that had lost communications was deactivated, removing the safety bubble holding the AHTs, which were in exception mode. The AHTs reverted to their last command and resumed autonomous operation.' Direct cause: 'Once the light vehicles in the area were deactivated, which removed the projected safety bubble, the AHTs reverted from exception to autonomous mode allowing them to resume operations'. Contributory causes: 'AHTs were in exception mode and not suspended (unsafe mode to approach)'; 'Ability for personnel to override system functions that are designed as critical safety controls'; 'AHTs did not detect a person about to board'; 'Lack of understanding or clarity regarding the actions of the AHTs in various modes of operation'. Instructions had been given to deactivate vehicles in the area 'due to the belief that all AHTs were unable to resume autonomous operations'. The two trucks 'unexpectedly drove forward', 'activating two blasts of the horn to signal commencement of forward movement'. 'On hearing the warning, the operators took evasive action, with one entering the AHT cab and taking control, while the other moved out of the path of the second AHT as it drove past.' The report gives no incident date, time, speed or distance. Outcome: averted by control; Near miss: two operators 'exposed to potentially serious injury'; the report records evasive action and does not describe any injury; as of 15 Nov 2026. not evidenced in source: the report names no mine, operator or manufacturer and records no prosecution, fine or allocation of responsibility.
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Controls that address what went wrong
2 controls missing or failed; 1 in place and worked. The line under each is the concrete form it would have taken in this case.
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The same gap in other cases
Cases where the same control was missing or failed. Those in another world are the cross-domain comparisons the Register exists to make.
| Control | Same world | Other worlds |
|---|---|---|
| Mandate disclosed to supervisor | Boeing 737 MAX MCAS | · |
| Physical safety interlock | · | Sorting robot, Korea 2023 (boundary) (machines) |