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Cases / REG-0061

Two autonomous haul trucks, stopped and in exception mode, resume autonomous operation and drive forward as two operators move to board them, after a nearby vehicle is deactivated and removes the safety bubble holding them; near miss reported by the Western Australian mines safety regulator, report dated 24 May 2021

Stopped by the operator's controlMachines · Enterprise work agentsMachine acts aloneProduction
REG-0061Updated 2026-11-152 sources, 2 linkedPublic regulatory

What happened

not evidenced in source: the report does not name the mine, its operator or the party that directed the trucks' work. Two autonomous haul trucks (AHTs) under an autonomous haulage system (AHS). The report does not name the manufacturer, the model or the system's supplier. 'The failure of a communications trailer providing wireless coverage for the autonomous haulage system (AHS) caused a reduction in network coverage. As a result, the two AHTs came to a stop as per protocol for loss of communications.' 'It was later determined that the two AHTs had not lost communication, but had stopped due to other vehicles nearby losing communications.' Contributory cause: 'Limited redundancy in communications network utilised by the AHS'. 'While the operators were near the trucks and moving to board, the last vehicle that had lost communications was deactivated, removing the safety bubble holding the AHTs, which were in exception mode. The AHTs reverted to their last command and resumed autonomous operation.' Direct cause: 'Once the light vehicles in the area were deactivated, which removed the projected safety bubble, the AHTs reverted from exception to autonomous mode allowing them to resume operations'. Contributory causes: 'AHTs were in exception mode and not suspended (unsafe mode to approach)'; 'Ability for personnel to override system functions that are designed as critical safety controls'; 'AHTs did not detect a person about to board'; 'Lack of understanding or clarity regarding the actions of the AHTs in various modes of operation'. Instructions had been given to deactivate vehicles in the area 'due to the belief that all AHTs were unable to resume autonomous operations'. The two trucks 'unexpectedly drove forward', 'activating two blasts of the horn to signal commencement of forward movement'. 'On hearing the warning, the operators took evasive action, with one entering the AHT cab and taking control, while the other moved out of the path of the second AHT as it drove past.' The report gives no incident date, time, speed or distance. Outcome: averted by control; Near miss: two operators 'exposed to potentially serious injury'; the report records evasive action and does not describe any injury; as of 15 Nov 2026. not evidenced in source: the report names no mine, operator or manufacturer and records no prosecution, fine or allocation of responsibility.

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Controls that address what went wrong

2 controls missing or failed; 1 in place and worked. The line under each is the concrete form it would have taken in this case.

Mandate disclosed to supervisor
Mechanism: per the report, instructions were given to deactivate vehicles in the area 'due to the belief that all AHTs were unable to resume autonomous operations', and a contributory cause was 'lack of understanding or clarity regarding the actions of the AHTs in various modes of operation'. Why it interrupts: if the people directing the recovery had known that trucks in exception mode would resume their last command once the bubble was removed, the deactivation and the approach would not have rested on that belief. Source shows the understanding absent. The report does not run the counterfactual.
Absent · Mandate layer
Physical safety interlock
Failed: Mechanism: per the report, the trucks were 'in exception mode and not suspended (unsafe mode to approach)', so when the safety bubble was removed they resumed autonomous operation, and they 'did not detect a person about to board'. Why it interrupts: a stop state for approach (suspension) or presence detection at the truck would have kept the trucks from moving toward people boarding them, independently of the communications bubble that was removed. Source shows it failed: the projected safety bubble holding the trucks was removed by the deactivation, the trucks were not suspended, the state the report calls safe to approach, and they did not detect a person about to board. it does not say whether a person-detection function was fitted. The report's action is that 'safe states in which AHTs can be approached are clearly defined'. The source does not run the counterfactual.
Failed · Envelope layer
Audible warning at the start of autonomous movement
Worked

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How it unfolded, layer by layer

MandateWhat it was told to do
Who deployed it: not evidenced in source: the report does not name the mine, its operator or the party that directed the trucks' work. The task: not evidenced in source: the report does not state the trucks' assigned route or task at the time.
ActorWhat acted
Two autonomous haul trucks (AHTs) under an autonomous haulage system (AHS). The report does not name the manufacturer, the model or the system's supplier
InputsWhat it could see
'The failure of a communications trailer providing wireless coverage for the autonomous haulage system (AHS) caused a reduction in network coverage. As a result, the two AHTs came to a stop as per protocol for loss of communications.' 'It was later determined that the two AHTs had not lost communication, but had stopped due to other vehicles nearby losing communications.' Contributory cause: 'Limited redundancy in communications network utilised by the AHS'
DecisionHow it chose
'While the operators were near the trucks and moving to board, the last vehicle that had lost communications was deactivated, removing the safety bubble holding the AHTs, which were in exception mode. The AHTs reverted to their last command and resumed autonomous operation.' Direct cause: 'Once the light vehicles in the area were deactivated, which removed the projected safety bubble, the AHTs reverted from exception to autonomous mode allowing them to resume operations'
EnvelopeWhat it was allowed to do
Limits in place: Contributory causes: 'AHTs were in exception mode and not suspended (unsafe mode to approach)'; 'Ability for personnel to override system functions that are designed as critical safety controls'; 'AHTs did not detect a person about to board'; 'Lack of understanding or clarity regarding the actions of the AHTs in various modes of operation'. Instructions had been given to deactivate vehicles in the area 'due to the belief that all AHTs were unable to resume autonomous operations'.
ActionWhat it did
The two trucks 'unexpectedly drove forward', 'activating two blasts of the horn to signal commencement of forward movement'. 'On hearing the warning, the operators took evasive action, with one entering the AHT cab and taking control, while the other moved out of the path of the second AHT as it drove past.' The report gives no incident date, time, speed or distance
OutcomeWhat happened
Stopped by the operator's control. Severity: Near miss: two operators 'exposed to potentially serious injury'; the report records evasive action and does not describe any injury.
EvidenceWhat can be proven
Significant Incident Report No. 286, 'Near miss following unplanned movement of autonomous haul trucks during recovery operations', dated 24 May 2021 and 'approved for release by the State Mining Engineer on 24 May 2021'; published on WorkSafe WA's site (page published 07 March 2025, last updated 10 March 2025). Direct causes also include 'Operators attempted to board the AHTs while they were not under their control' and 'The operators did not identify that the AHTs were in exception mode when attempting to board'; contributory causes also include 'Operators did not observe the AHTs status mode indicator lights' and 'Previous AHS communication issues may have desensitised the operators to potential hazards'
RecoveryWhat could be stopped, undone, answered for
Technical recovery: Actions required by the report: review procedures for boarding an AHT so that safe systems of work are based on original equipment manufacturer recommendations; training and assessment programs ensure competence, with task observations; 'conditions are risk assessed if personnel are permitted to manually override safety controls'; 'safe states in which AHTs can be approached are clearly defined and recognisable in the field'; 'robust communication networks are in place'; and 'tele-remote operation or follow me operation for moving AHTs is considered'. The report does not say what the mine itself changed. Accountability: not evidenced in source: the report names no mine, operator or manufacturer and records no prosecution, fine or allocation of responsibility.

The same gap in other cases

Cases where the same control was missing or failed. Those in another world are the cross-domain comparisons the Register exists to make.

ControlSame worldOther worlds
Mandate disclosed to supervisorBoeing 737 MAX MCAS·
Physical safety interlock·Sorting robot, Korea 2023 (boundary) (machines)

Cost and accountability

SeverityNear miss: two operators 'exposed to potentially serious injury'; the report records evasive action and does not describe any injury
AffectedTwo operators attempting to board the trucks
Costnot disclosed
Regulatory or legal consequenceThe Western Australian mines safety regulator published the event as Significant Incident Report No. 286, approved for release by the State Mining Engineer on 24 May 2021, with 'Actions required' for reviewing procedures for boarding an autonomous haul truck. The report names no operator and records no fine, order or prosecution
Technical recoveryTechnical recovery: Actions required by the report: review procedures for boarding an AHT so that safe systems of work are based on original equipment manufacturer recommendations; training and assessment programs ensure competence, with task observations; 'conditions are risk assessed if personnel are permitted to manually override safety controls'; 'safe states in which AHTs can be approached are clearly defined and recognisable in the field'; 'robust communication networks are in place'; and 'tele-remote operation or follow me operation for moving AHTs is considered'. The report does not say what the mine itself changed.
Accountabilitynot evidenced in source: the report names no mine, operator or manufacturer and records no prosecution, fine or allocation of responsibility
Draft interpretationWhy it matters beyond its domain. The Western Australian mines safety regulator's report says two autonomous haul trucks, stopped in exception mode because nearby vehicles had lost communications, resumed their last command and drove forward as two operators moved to board them, once the last such vehicle was deactivated and the safety bubble holding the trucks was removed; the operators took evasive action after a two-blast horn warning. Among the causes the report lists are that the trucks were in exception mode and not suspended, a lack of clarity about how the trucks behave in each mode, and that the trucks did not detect a person about to board. The record does not give the incident date, name the mine, the operator or the system's manufacturer, or say what the mine changed afterwards. The Register's reading, not a fact; awaiting the editor's sign-off.

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