Uber Advanced Technologies Group test vehicle strikes pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, 18 March 2018
The typed evidence object. This is the working store; the case page is the reader's form.
| Layer / facet | Value | Type | Sources | Conf. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mandate: principal | Uber Technologies, Inc., through its Advanced Technologies Group, operating a public-road test program | fact | NTSB Preliminary Report, Highway HWY18MH010 (Tempe, Arizona, 18 March 2018); NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | high |
| Mandate: objective | Drive the test route under computer control with a safety driver as the only intervention path | fact | NTSB Preliminary Report, Highway HWY18MH010 (Tempe, Arizona, 18 March 2018) | high |
| Actor | Uber's automated driving system on a modified Volvo XC90 | fact | NTSB Preliminary Report, Highway HWY18MH010 (Tempe, Arizona, 18 March 2018) | high |
| Inputs | Radar first detected the pedestrian 5.6 seconds before impact, with the vehicle at 44.3 mph; lidar (light detection and ranging) detected her 5.2 seconds before impact | fact | NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | high |
| Decision | The software never classified the pedestrian as a pedestrian: it classified her first as a vehicle, then alternated among unknown object, vehicle and bicycle, and at each change it dropped her tracking history, so it did not correctly predict her path. 1.2 seconds before impact it determined that her location was in the vehicle's path and a collision was imminent | fact | NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | high |
| Envelope: authority | By Uber's design, automated braking under computer control was capped at 0.71 g (0.71 times the acceleration of gravity, 7 meters per second squared). When avoiding a collision needed harder braking than its limits allowed, the system suppressed braking for one second, and if the collision still could not be avoided within the cap it was not designed to brake hard just to lessen the impact | fact | NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | high |
| Envelope: constraints | Volvo's factory collision warning and automatic emergency braking were disabled under computer control; the system gave no alert during its one-second action-suppression period and sounded an auditory alert about 0.2 seconds before impact | fact | NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | high |
| Action | No emergency braking by the system; the vehicle struck the pedestrian at 39 mph | fact | NTSB Preliminary Report, Highway HWY18MH010 (Tempe, Arizona, 18 March 2018) | high |
| Outcome | State: harm. One pedestrian killed. Affected: pedestrian; operator later charged. As of 2023. | fact | Maricopa County Attorney's Office, "Driver of Uber Vehicle Involved in Death of Woman in Tempe Pleads Guilty" | high |
| Evidence: causality | NTSB found the probable cause was the operator's failure to monitor the driving environment because she was visually distracted by her phone. Contributing: Uber ATG's inadequate safety risk assessment, ineffective oversight of vehicle operators, and lack of measures against automation complacency; the pedestrian's crossing outside a crosswalk while impaired; and the Arizona Department of Transportation's insufficient oversight. NTSB separately found that deactivating the Volvo systems without replacing their full capabilities removed a layer of safety redundancy | fact | NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | high |
| Evidence: actor | Automated driving system data and video from the system's cameras and from an aftermarket camera unit facing forward, rearward and at the operator, provided by Uber's Advanced Technologies Group to the National Transportation Safety Board's investigators | fact | NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | high |
| Recovery: automated fallback | No automated fallback once a collision could not be avoided within the system's braking limits: the design precluded emergency braking to lessen a collision and relied on the operator to avoid it or mitigate the impact; after the one-second suppression the system sounded an alert and initiated a plan for a gradual slowdown | interpretation | NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | high |
| Recovery: technical | Safety driver began steering less than a second before impact and braking less than a second after | fact | NTSB Preliminary Report, Highway HWY18MH010 (Tempe, Arizona, 18 March 2018) | high |
| Recovery: technical | Uber's Advanced Technologies Group stopped public-road testing on 19 March 2018. When it resumed on 20 December 2018, Volvo's collision warning and automatic emergency braking stayed active under computer control; the system no longer suppressed braking after detecting an emergency and would brake even only to lessen a crash; it kept an object's tracking history across reclassifications and could predict a pedestrian crossing outside a crosswalk; each vehicle carried two operators; and testing was limited to a 1-mile loop in Pittsburgh at up to 25 mph (as of the NTSB final report, November 2019) | fact | NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | high |
| Recovery: accountability | The operator pleaded guilty on 28 July 2023 to endangerment, a class 6 undesignated offense, and was sentenced to three years of supervised probation; the judge determined the charge would be designated a misdemeanor only on successful completion of her sentence | fact | Maricopa County Attorney's Office, "Driver of Uber Vehicle Involved in Death of Woman in Tempe Pleads Guilty" | high |
| Recovery: accountability | The Yavapai County Attorney, asked to review the case after the Maricopa County Attorney's Office cited a potential conflict of interest, found no basis for criminal liability for Uber and returned the case to the Maricopa County Attorney to decide whether to file criminal charges (5 March 2019, as reported by AP) | assertion | Associated Press, 'Arizona Prosecutor Says Uber Not Criminally Liable in Deadly Crash' (Arizona Public Media copy, updated 6 March 2019), 5 March 2019 | high |
| Recovery: accountability | Arizona's governor suspended Uber's autonomous testing in the state (26 March 2018, as reported by CBS News) | assertion | CBS News/AP, 'Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey suspends Uber from autonomous testing', 26 March 2018 (reports the governor's letter) | high |
| Recovery: accountability | The family's lawyer said Uber had reached a settlement with the pedestrian's daughter and husband ('The matter has been resolved'); no terms were given (late March 2018, as reported by NPR on 29 March 2018) | assertion | NPR, 'Uber Reaches Settlement With Family Of Arizona Woman Killed By Driverless Car', 29 March 2018 | medium |
Controls
| Status | Control | Canonical |
|---|---|---|
| failed | Operator takeover as the primary emergency safeguard: the one-second braking suppression allowed time for the operator to take control, but no alert was given when it began. Second operator in vehicle (absent: Uber moved to a single operator in September to October 2017) | C-R3 Human takeover with a time window |
| failed | Operator alerting on detected hazard: no alert when the system detected the emergency 1.2 seconds before impact; an auditory alert came 0.2 seconds before impact | C-I4 Warnings designed as alerts |
| absent | Automated emergency braking under computer control: the system was not designed to brake beyond its 0.71 g cap or to brake hard only to lessen an unavoidable impact, and Volvo's automatic emergency braking was switched off | C-R2 Automated fail-safe |
Unmapped
- Disabled safety function by design: recorded under controls (absent), not a layer
Inference
inference The system detected the pedestrian 5.6 seconds before impact but never classified her as a pedestrian or correctly predicted her path. When it identified the emergency 1.2 seconds out, avoiding her needed harder braking than its design allowed, so it held off braking for one second and then, as designed, did not brake hard to lessen the impact; the design relied on an operator who was visually distracted by her phone. In Volvo's simulation, which assumed ideal sensors, the factory emergency braking that had been switched off under computer control avoided the collision in 17 of 20 variations and cut impact speed below 10 miles per hour in the rest, and the National Transportation Safety Board wrote that the tests suggest a standard Volvo XC90 with its factory collision warning and emergency braking might have prevented or at least mitigated the crash. The Board named the operator's distraction as the probable cause and found that the braking design increased risk, without listing it as a cause; the record does not show what the system's own braking from 1.2 seconds would have achieved.
Sources
| ID | Record | Type | Link |
|---|---|---|---|
| AZ-PLEA | Maricopa County Attorney's Office, "Driver of Uber Vehicle Involved in Death of Woman in Tempe Pleads Guilty" | public record primary record | maricopacountyattorney.org ↗ checked 2026-10-20 |
| NTSB-FIN | NTSB Highway Accident Report NTSB/HAR-19/03, Collision Between Vehicle Controlled by Developmental Automated Driving System and Pedestrian, Tempe, Arizona, March 18, 2018 | regulator primary record | ntsb.gov ↗ checked 2026-10-20 |
| NTSB-PRE | NTSB Preliminary Report, Highway HWY18MH010 (Tempe, Arizona, 18 March 2018) | regulator primary record | data.ntsb.gov ↗ checked 2026-10-20 |
| YAV-AP | Associated Press, 'Arizona Prosecutor Says Uber Not Criminally Liable in Deadly Crash' (Arizona Public Media copy, updated 6 March 2019), 5 March 2019 | press pointer secondary: press report | azpm.org ↗ checked 2026-10-20 |
| AZ-SUSP | CBS News/AP, 'Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey suspends Uber from autonomous testing', 26 March 2018 (reports the governor's letter) | press pointer secondary: press report | cbsnews.com ↗ checked 2026-10-20 |
| SETTLE-NPR | NPR, 'Uber Reaches Settlement With Family Of Arizona Woman Killed By Driverless Car', 29 March 2018 | press pointer secondary: press report | npr.org ↗ checked 2026-10-20 |