Controls › C-I2
Input redundancy and disagreement check
Action gated on agreement between independent inputs.
Inputs layerMissing or failed in 1 case (1 ended in harm)Worked in 0Machines: 1
Where it was missing or failed
The third column is what this control would have looked like in that case: the concrete form, not the abstract name.
| Case | World | What it would have looked like here | Status | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boeing 737 MAX MCAS | Machines | Single-sensor dependence; Sensor disagreement check gating activation (absent) | failed | Ended in harm |
Rules and standards that map to it
Strength says whether the rule's text requires this control, implies it, or only recommends it. Draft mappings are the Register's reading, not yet checked by a person, and none is legal advice.
| Rule | Strength | Where, and why | Jurisdiction |
|---|---|---|---|
| 14 CFR 25.1309: equipment, systems, and installations (transport aircraft certification) (draft mapping) | Implied | a single sensor driving a flight control function failed this standard's intent (MCAS) | United States |
| ISO 21448: safety of the intended functionality (SOTIF) (draft mapping) | Recommended | redundancy and disagreement checks are the usual mitigation for sensor limitation | International standard |
Recent signals touching this control
| Date | Signal | Kind |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-18 | Meta: automated protections wrongly took the No Kings Instagram account offline Meta says its automated protections took the No Kings coalition's Instagram account offline on 17 October after reading traffic that it attributes to a Claude tool resembled a bot, that an automated re-review restored the account about an hour later, and that the removal was an error. Source ↗ | disclosure |
Deploying something? Check a deployment ranks every control against the cases that match your profile. Patterns shows where this control fails across worlds.