Controls › C-E6
Authority limit on automation over humans
Bounded authority for a system to override a human operator.
Envelope layerMissing or failed in 1 case (1 ended in harm)Worked in 0Machines: 1
Where it was missing or failed
The third column is what this control would have looked like in that case: the concrete form, not the abstract name.
| Case | World | What it would have looked like here | Status | Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Boeing 737 MAX MCAS | Machines | Authority limits | failed | Ended in harm |
Rules and standards that map to it
Strength says whether the rule's text requires this control, implies it, or only recommends it. Draft mappings are the Register's reading, not yet checked by a person, and none is legal advice.
| Rule | Strength | Where, and why | Jurisdiction |
|---|---|---|---|
| Colorado automated decision-making technology law (SB 26-189, replacing the Colorado AI Act, SB 24-205) (draft mapping) | Required by the text | right to meaningful human review and reconsideration by a reviewer with authority to change the decision, who must not simply defer to the system | Colorado, United States |
| California CCPA regulations on automated decisionmaking technology, risk assessments, and cybersecurity audits (draft mapping) | Required by the text | opt-out, or an appeal to a human reviewer who can overturn the decision | California, United States |
Deploying something? Check a deployment ranks every control against the cases that match your profile. Patterns shows where this control fails across worlds.