{
 "schema_version": "0.4",
 "id": "REG-0015",
 "title": "The DAO: an attacker uses the contract's own logic to drain a third of its funds; the network reverses it by hard fork, June to July 2016",
 "batch": "B1",
 "family": "transaction",
 "context": {
  "domain": "Autonomous code holding and moving value",
  "autonomy_level": "alone",
  "actor_type": "Software: a smart contract on Ethereum",
  "actors": {
   "count": 1,
   "text": "1 contract; 1 unidentified attacker",
   "roles": [
    "defender"
   ]
  },
  "mandate_context": "production",
  "jurisdiction": [
   "United States (SEC report)",
   "global network"
  ],
  "autonomy_level_text": "Machine acts alone; no human able to intervene within the code",
  "mandate_context_text": "Production"
 },
 "provenance_tier": "public_regulatory",
 "status": "confirmed",
 "fields": [
  {
   "layer": "Mandate",
   "facet": "principal",
   "value": "Token holders voted on proposals, but the SEC found that Slock.it, its co-founders, and the DAO's Curators made significant managerial efforts, and that the Curators kept ultimate control over which proposals went to a vote",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "SEC-DAO"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Mandate",
   "facet": "objective",
   "value": "Hold contributed funds and release them to projects approved by holder vote",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "SEC-DAO"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Actor",
   "facet": null,
   "value": "The DAO contract",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "SEC-DAO"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Inputs",
   "facet": null,
   "value": "Transactions from an attacker who called The DAO's split function recursively, from inside the split itself, collecting ether many times in one transaction; the SEC's report describes it as a flaw in The DAO's code",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "EF-CRIT",
    "SEC-DAO"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Decision",
   "facet": null,
   "value": "The contract executed as written: the recursive call let the attacker collect ether many times in one transaction",
   "assertion_type": "interpretation",
   "source_ids": [
    "EF-CRIT"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Envelope",
   "facet": "constraints",
   "value": "The code was the envelope; as written, it permitted the drain, through what the SEC's report calls a flaw in The DAO's code",
   "assertion_type": "interpretation",
   "source_ids": [
    "SEC-DAO"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Action",
   "facet": null,
   "value": "About 3.6 million ether, a third of the DAO's funds, moved into a child contract",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "SEC-DAO",
    "EF-CRIT"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Outcome",
   "facet": null,
   "value": "State: harm, then reversed for most holders. Funds restored by the fork on one chain; the other chain kept the original history. As of 2017.",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "CHAIN",
    "SEC-DAO"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Evidence",
   "facet": "event",
   "value": "Fully visible on the public ledger",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "CHAIN",
    "EF-CRIT"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Evidence",
   "facet": "actor",
   "value": "The SEC's report refers only to 'an unknown individual or group'; no authority has named the attacker. In February 2022 a journalist's investigation named a suspect, who denied it",
   "assertion_type": "assertion",
   "source_ids": [
    "SEC-DAO",
    "DECRYPT-DAO"
   ],
   "confidence": "medium",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Recovery",
   "facet": "automated fallback",
   "value": "A built-in holding period delayed withdrawal, which created the window for a response",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "SEC-DAO"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Recovery",
   "facet": "technical",
   "value": "A hard fork of the network, adopted by majority of participants, moved the funds to a recovery contract; a minority chain refused",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "CHAIN",
    "EIP-779"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  },
  {
   "layer": "Recovery",
   "facet": "accountability",
   "value": "No individual held liable. The SEC found that DAO Tokens were securities, whose offer and sale had to be registered unless an exemption applied; its report makes no finding of a violation by any individual or entity, and the SEC decided not to pursue an enforcement action",
   "assertion_type": "fact",
   "source_ids": [
    "SEC-DAO"
   ],
   "confidence": "high",
   "disputed": false
  }
 ],
 "controls": {
  "failed": [
   {
    "id": "C-D1",
    "note": "Security review of The DAO's code before launch: Slock.it said a leading security audit company had reviewed it, yet the code held the flaw the attacker used; no source says whether the review covered the split function",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "basis": "curated"
   },
   {
    "id": "C-M2",
    "note": "The code was the only enforced rule: the SEC report says The DAO's code 'was to govern how The DAO was to operate' and quotes The DAO's website describing it as 'operating solely with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable code'; the Curators, on whom the website said The DAO relied for 'failsafe protection', controlled which proposals reached a vote, and no source says a Curator could stop a split",
    "confidence": "high",
    "basis": "curated"
   }
  ],
  "succeeded": [
   {
    "id": "C-R3",
    "note": "Holding period (delay before irreversibility); Community-level override",
    "confidence": "high",
    "basis": "curated"
   }
  ],
  "absent": [
   {
    "id": "C-X2",
    "note": "Pause or circuit-breaker in the contract",
    "confidence": "high",
    "basis": "curated"
   },
   {
    "id": "C-X1",
    "note": "Withdrawal limits",
    "confidence": "high",
    "basis": "curated"
   }
  ]
 },
 "applicable_rules": [
  "Securities law (SEC 21(a) report)"
 ],
 "unmapped": [],
 "corrections": [
  {
   "date": "2026-10-13",
   "field": "fields and sources",
   "old": "'token holders, by design; no individual operator'; 'the code was presented as the complete rule set'; '$50 to 60 million'; mechanism typed fact on the Foundation's post",
   "new": "principal per the SEC report (Slock.it, co-founders, Curators); objective and amount as the SEC report states; mechanism typed interpretation; fork cited to EIP-779 and the Foundation's post",
   "reason": "claims aligned to what each linked record says, found on review"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-16",
   "field": "inference.value",
   "old": "The only case so far where recovery was a social override of the actor's mandate by the actor's own community; it shows that a literal mandate with no envelope beyond the code has no recovery path except changing the world the code runs in",
   "new": "The only case so far where recovery came from the actor's own community overriding what the code allowed. A mandate written only as code, with no limits beyond it, has no recovery path except changing the system the code runs on.",
   "reason": "Reworded for readers before the editor's sign-off, after an outside review found it read as internal notes; the interpretation itself is unchanged"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-16",
   "field": "controls",
   "old": "the same control listed more than once in one state",
   "new": "one entry per control, notes combined",
   "reason": "Found in an outside review of the published record on 16 October 2026: repeated entries showed the same control twice on the page"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-19",
   "field": "sources.EF-CRIT",
   "old": null,
   "new": "https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/",
   "reason": "Added in the editor's review of 19 October 2026: the Ethereum Foundation's account of the attack on the day it happened, the record for how the attack worked (Inputs, Decision) and where the ether went (Action)"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-19",
   "field": "sources.DECRYPT-DAO",
   "old": null,
   "new": "https://decrypt.co/93547",
   "reason": "Added in the editor's review of 19 October 2026 for the Evidence layer: a 2022 press identification of a suspect, and the suspect's denial"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-19",
   "field": "fields (Inputs, Decision, Action)",
   "old": "{\"Inputs\": {\"value\": \"Transactions from an attacker exploiting a recursive-call weakness in the split function\", \"source_ids\": [\"SEC-DAO\"]}, \"Decision\": {\"value\": \"The contract executed as written: it released funds repeatedly before updating balances\", \"source_ids\": [\"CHAIN\"]}, \"Action\": {\"source_ids\": [\"SEC-DAO\"]}}",
   "new": "{\"Inputs\": {\"value\": \"Transactions from an attacker who called The DAO's split function recursively, from inside the split itself, collecting ether many times in one transaction; the SEC's report describes it as a flaw in The DAO's code\", \"source_ids\": [\"EF-CRIT\", \"SEC-DAO\"]}, \"Decision\": {\"value\": \"The contract executed as written: the recursive call let the attacker collect ether many times in one transaction\", \"source_ids\": [\"EF-CRIT\"]}, \"Action\": {\"source_ids\": [\"SEC-DAO\", \"EF-CRIT\"]}}",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's review of 19 October 2026: the attack mechanism was attributed to records that do not describe it (the SEC's report says only that the attacker used a flaw in The DAO's code; the 20 July 2016 post does not describe the bug). It now cites the Ethereum Foundation's 17 June 2016 post, which does, and no longer says funds were released before balances were updated, which no source states. The Action claim (a child contract) now also cites that post; its wording is unchanged"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-19",
   "field": "fields.Recovery accountability",
   "old": "No individual held liable; the SEC later concluded DAO tokens were securities and the offering was unregistered",
   "new": "No individual held liable. The SEC found that DAO Tokens were securities, whose offer and sale had to be registered unless an exemption applied; its report makes no finding of a violation by any individual or entity, and the SEC decided not to pursue an enforcement action",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's review of 19 October 2026: the earlier wording said the SEC concluded the offering was unregistered. The report finds registration was required unless an exemption applied, makes no finding of a violation by any individual or entity, and brings no enforcement action"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-19",
   "field": "fields.Evidence actor",
   "old": "{\"value\": \"The SEC's report refers only to 'an attacker'; no authority has named one\", \"source_ids\": [\"SEC-DAO\"]}",
   "new": "{\"value\": \"The SEC's report refers only to 'an unknown individual or group'; no authority has named the attacker. In February 2022 a journalist's investigation named a suspect, who denied it\", \"source_ids\": [\"SEC-DAO\", \"DECRYPT-DAO\"]}",
   "reason": "Added in the editor's review of 19 October 2026: a 2022 press identification of a suspect, who denied it, labelled as an assertion. The Register does not name the person: no authority has named or charged anyone"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-19",
   "field": "provenance_tier",
   "old": "{\"provenance_tier\": \"disclosure_uncorroborated\", \"SEC-DAO tier\": \"disclosure_uncorroborated\"}",
   "new": "{\"provenance_tier\": \"public_regulatory\", \"SEC-DAO tier\": \"public_regulatory\"}",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's review of 19 October 2026: the case rests on a regulator's investigation report (the SEC's Section 21(a) report), but carried the label 'disclosure uncorroborated', the default the import script applied when it could not classify the source description; it was never a judgment"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-19",
   "field": "reviewed_by",
   "old": "none",
   "new": "Saurabh Bhatnagar (editor)",
   "reason": "case checked by the editor against its linked records, after the review corrections of 19 October 2026; recorded at the editor's instruction"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-19",
   "field": "named_parties[The DAO].right_of_reply",
   "old": "{\"offered\": null, \"response\": null}",
   "new": "{\"offered\": null, \"response\": null, \"no_party\": \"The DAO was code on the Ethereum network, with no legal entity or spokesperson to write to\"}",
   "reason": "No one is able to reply for The DAO: it was code on the Ethereum network with no legal entity or spokesperson, so no letter is sent; recorded at the editor's instruction"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-19",
   "field": "named_parties[Ethereum Foundation].right_of_reply",
   "old": "{\"offered\": null, \"response\": null}",
   "new": "{\"offered\": \"2026-10-19\", \"response\": null}",
   "reason": "Right of reply offered to the Ethereum Foundation at press@ethereum.org, sent by the editor from register@secureautonomous.com on 19 October 2026, Pacific time (confirmed in the Sent folder); recorded at the editor's instruction"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-20",
   "field": "title",
   "old": "The DAO: code executes its own logic to drain a third of its funds; the network reverses it by hard fork, June to July 2016",
   "new": "The DAO: an attacker uses the contract's own logic to drain a third of its funds; the network reverses it by hard fork, June to July 2016",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 October 2026: the SEC's report says 'an attacker used a flaw in The DAO's code to steal approximately one-third of The DAO's assets', and the Ethereum Foundation's post of 17 June 2016 says the attacker called the split function recursively. The title read as if the code drained its funds on its own; it now names the attacker who set the drain off"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-20",
   "field": "fields.Envelope constraints.value",
   "old": "The code was the envelope; it permitted the drain because it was written to",
   "new": "The code was the envelope; as written, it permitted the drain, through what the SEC's report calls a flaw in The DAO's code",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 October 2026: 'because it was written to' could be read as saying the code was designed to permit the drain. The SEC's report calls it 'a flaw in The DAO's code' and 'a weakness in the code'; no source says the drain was intended"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-20",
   "field": "fields.Outcome.source_ids",
   "old": "[\"CHAIN\"]",
   "new": "[\"CHAIN\", \"SEC-DAO\"]",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 October 2026: the Foundation's post of 20 July 2016 shows the transfer to the recovery contract and a non-fork chain, but not the result for holders or the 2017 date. The SEC's report (25 July 2017) states that all DAO Token holders who adopted the Hard Fork could exchange their DAO Tokens for ether 'and avoid any loss', and that a minority kept using the former chain, now known as Ethereum Classic. The wording is unchanged"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-20",
   "field": "fields.Evidence event.source_ids",
   "old": "[\"CHAIN\"]",
   "new": "[\"CHAIN\", \"EF-CRIT\"]",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 October 2026: the post of 20 July 2016 links the fork block on a public block explorer but does not show the attack itself. The Foundation's post of 17 June 2016 links The DAO's address and gives the public ledger address of the child DAO holding the drained ether. The wording is unchanged"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-20",
   "field": "controls.C-D1",
   "old": "{\"note\": \"Code review of the split function\", \"confidence\": \"medium\"}",
   "new": "{\"note\": \"Security review of The DAO's code before launch: Slock.it said a leading security audit company had reviewed it, yet the code held the flaw the attacker used; no source says whether the review covered the split function\", \"confidence\": \"medium\"}",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 October 2026: no source describes a review of the split function. The SEC's report records Slock.it's statement that The DAO's source code had been reviewed by 'one of the world's leading security audit companies', and that an attacker then used a flaw in The DAO's code. The note now says what the record shows; the bucket and confidence are unchanged"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-20",
   "field": "inference.value",
   "old": "The only case so far where recovery came from the actor's own community overriding what the code allowed. A mandate written only as code, with no limits beyond it, has no recovery path except changing the system the code runs on.",
   "new": "An attacker used a flaw in The DAO's code, a recursive call to its split function, to move about a third of its ether; the contract did what its code allowed. The code then held the moved ether for 27 days, which left time to respond. The response came from outside the code: DAO Token holders could not deal with the attack without Slock.it and others, and a hard fork of Ethereum, adopted by a majority of the network, moved the funds to a recovery contract, while a minority kept the original chain. The record does not show whether a pause or a withdrawal limit in the contract would have prevented or reduced the loss.",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 October 2026: 'The only case so far' is a superlative that no source or checked fix plan supports. 'The actor's own community' does not match the record: the SEC's report says DAO Token holders 'were unable to effectively address the Attack without the assistance of Slock.it and others', and that the fork was endorsed by Slock.it's co-founders and others and adopted by a majority of the Ethereum network. The closing rule (no recovery path except changing the system) is a general claim no source makes. The new wording states what the SEC's report and the Foundation's post of 17 June 2016 show, and what the record does not show. The interpretation was unsigned (signed_by null) and remains unsigned: the editor must sign this wording"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-20",
   "field": "inference.source_ids",
   "old": "[\"SEC-DAO\"]",
   "new": "[\"SEC-DAO\", \"EF-CRIT\"]",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's source re-check of 19-20 October 2026: the new wording names the mechanism (a recursive call to the split function), which the Foundation's post of 17 June 2016 describes and the SEC's report does not"
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-21",
   "field": "controls.C-M2",
   "old": "Mandate literalism as the sole rule",
   "new": "The code was the only enforced rule: the SEC report quotes The DAO's website that its code was to govern how it operated; the Curators, which the report calls 'failsafe protection', controlled which proposals reached a vote, and no source says a Curator could stop a split",
   "reason": "Editor's classification call of 21 October 2026 (call 16, accepted from pull request #74): reworded so the note sits with the SEC report's description of the Curators as 'failsafe protection'; bucket and confidence unchanged."
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-21",
   "field": "inference.value",
   "old": "An attacker used a flaw in The DAO's code, a recursive call to its split function, to move about a third of its ether; the contract did what its code allowed. The code then held the moved ether for 27 days, which left time to respond. The response came from outside the code: DAO Token holders could not deal with the attack without Slock.it and others, and a hard fork of Ethereum, adopted by a majority of the network, moved the funds to a recovery contract, while a minority kept the original chain. The record does not show whether a pause or a withdrawal limit in the contract would have prevented or reduced the loss.",
   "new": "An attacker used a flaw in The DAO's code, a recursive call to its split function, to move about a third of its ether; the contract did what its code allowed. The code then held the moved ether for 27 days, which left time to respond. The response came from outside the code: DAO Token holders could not effectively deal with the attack without Slock.it and others, and a hard fork of Ethereum, adopted by a majority of the network, moved the funds to a recovery contract, while a minority kept the original chain. The record does not show whether a pause or a withdrawal limit in the contract would have prevented or reduced the loss.",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's second, independent check of the interpretations, 21 October 2026: the SEC report's qualifier restored: 'unable to effectively address the Attack without the assistance of Slock.it and others' (SEC-DAO)."
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-21",
   "field": "inference.source_ids",
   "old": "[\"SEC-DAO\", \"EF-CRIT\"]",
   "new": "[\"SEC-DAO\", \"EF-CRIT\", \"CHAIN\"]",
   "reason": "Found in the editor's second, independent check of the interpretations, 21 October 2026: 'recovery contract' is the wording of the Ethereum Foundation's 'Hard Fork Completed' post (CHAIN), now cited by the interpretation."
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-21",
   "field": "inference.signed_by",
   "old": "Saurabh Bhatnagar",
   "new": null,
   "reason": "The interpretation's wording changed after the editor signed it (second, independent check of 21 October 2026); the signature is cleared so the editor signs the corrected wording."
  },
  {
   "date": "2026-10-22",
   "field": "controls.C-M2",
   "old": "The code was the only enforced rule: the SEC report quotes The DAO's website that its code was to govern how it operated; the Curators, which the report calls 'failsafe protection', controlled which proposals reached a vote, and no source says a Curator could stop a split",
   "new": "The code was the only enforced rule: the SEC report says The DAO's code 'was to govern how The DAO was to operate' and quotes The DAO's website describing it as 'operating solely with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable code'; the Curators, on whom the website said The DAO relied for 'failsafe protection', controlled which proposals reached a vote, and no source says a Curator could stop a split",
   "reason": "Found in the independent re-read of 22 October 2026: the note attributed the SEC's own sentence ('was to govern how The DAO was to operate') to the website and the website's phrase ('failsafe protection') to the SEC; both are now attributed as the report has them (SEC Release 34-81207)."
  }
 ],
 "created": "2026-10-06",
 "last_reviewed": "2026-10-19",
 "actor_status": "unverified",
 "provenance_tier_text": "Public ledger, SEC report",
 "status_text": "Confirmed",
 "outcome": {
  "state": "harm",
  "severity": "financial (reversed on one chain)",
  "affected_parties": [
   "token holders"
  ],
  "cost": "~3.6M ether at the time",
  "regime_consequence": "SEC 21(a) report",
  "as_of": "2017",
  "derived_by": "backfill-curated"
 },
 "inference": {
  "value": "An attacker used a flaw in The DAO's code, a recursive call to its split function, to move about a third of its ether; the contract did what its code allowed. The code then held the moved ether for 27 days, which left time to respond. The response came from outside the code: DAO Token holders could not effectively deal with the attack without Slock.it and others, and a hard fork of Ethereum, adopted by a majority of the network, moved the funds to a recovery contract, while a minority kept the original chain. The record does not show whether a pause or a withdrawal limit in the contract would have prevented or reduced the loss.",
  "source_ids": [
   "SEC-DAO",
   "EF-CRIT",
   "CHAIN"
  ],
  "confidence": "high",
  "signed_by": "Saurabh Bhatnagar",
  "signed_on": "2026-10-21"
 },
 "named_parties": [
  {
   "name": "The DAO",
   "right_of_reply": {
    "offered": null,
    "response": null,
    "no_party": "The DAO was code on the Ethereum network, with no legal entity or spokesperson to write to"
   }
  },
  {
   "name": "Ethereum Foundation",
   "right_of_reply": {
    "offered": "2026-10-19",
    "response": null,
    "assessed_through": "2026-10-22",
    "assessments": [
     {
      "through": "2026-10-22",
      "date": "2026-10-22",
      "by": "editor's call of 22 October 2026 on the rule 19 review by four independent agents (reports rule19_1 to rule19_4); GitHub (REG-0005) judged borderline and not triggering",
      "triggered": [],
      "note": "no correction since the offer adds or worsens a claim about this party in words that are not its own"
     }
    ]
   }
  }
 ],
 "sources": {
  "CHAIN": {
   "title": "Ethereum Foundation blog, \"Hard Fork Completed\" (Vitalik Buterin)",
   "type": "company",
   "url": "https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/07/20/hard-fork-completed",
   "via_press": false,
   "date": "2016-07-20",
   "tier": "disclosure_uncorroborated",
   "interest": null,
   "primary": true,
   "checked": "2026-10-13"
  },
  "SEC-DAO": {
   "title": "SEC, Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Release No. 81207",
   "type": "regulator",
   "url": "https://www.sec.gov/files/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf",
   "via_press": false,
   "date": "2017-07-25",
   "tier": "public_regulatory",
   "interest": null,
   "primary": true,
   "checked": "2026-10-13"
  },
  "EIP-779": {
   "title": "EIP-779: Hardfork Meta: DAO Fork (block 1,920,000)",
   "type": "standards_body",
   "url": "https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-779",
   "via_press": false,
   "date": "2017-11-26",
   "tier": "public_regulatory",
   "interest": null,
   "primary": true,
   "checked": "2026-10-13"
  },
  "EF-CRIT": {
   "title": "Ethereum Foundation blog, \"CRITICAL UPDATE Re: DAO Vulnerability\" (Vitalik Buterin), 17 June 2016",
   "type": "company",
   "url": "https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/06/17/critical-update-re-dao-vulnerability/",
   "via_press": false,
   "date": "2016-06-17",
   "tier": "disclosure_corroborated",
   "interest": null,
   "primary": true,
   "checked": "2026-10-19"
  },
  "DECRYPT-DAO": {
   "title": "Decrypt, 'Former Crypto CEO Denies Responsibility for $11 Billion Ethereum DAO Hack', 22 February 2022 (reports a journalist's identification of a suspect and the suspect's denial)",
   "type": "press_pointer",
   "url": "https://decrypt.co/93547",
   "via_press": true,
   "date": "2022-02-22",
   "tier": "press",
   "interest": null,
   "primary": false,
   "checked": "2026-10-19"
  }
 },
 "derived_by": "backfill-curated",
 "reviewed_by": "Saurabh Bhatnagar (editor)"
}