[
 {
  "id": "RULE-001",
  "title": "NHTSA Standing General Order 2021-01 (crash reporting for automated driving and Level 2 systems)",
  "short": "NHTSA Standing General Order 2021-01",
  "body": "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "reporting"
  ],
  "kind": "order",
  "status": "in force (amended 2023 and 2025)",
  "url": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/laws-regulations/standing-general-order-crash-reporting",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "Manufacturers and operators of vehicles with automated driving systems or Level 2 driver assistance must report crashes to the regulator within set deadlines, with later updates as facts emerge.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "the order exists to make incident reporting complete and timely; penalties attach to reporting failures (Cruise)",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "a reportable crash needs a record independent of the driving stack to report from",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Standing General Order"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0003",
    "short": "Cruise 2023",
    "text": "NHTSA Standing General Order 2021-01",
    "outcome": "harm",
    "outcome_label": "Ended in harm"
   },
   {
    "id": "REG-0013",
    "short": "Waymo construction zones 2026",
    "text": "NHTSA Standing General Order",
    "outcome": "averted_by_control",
    "outcome_label": "Stopped by the operator's control"
   },
   {
    "id": "REG-0016",
    "short": "Benavides v. Tesla 2025",
    "text": "NHTSA Standing General Order (post-2021 reporting; not applicable to the 2019 crash)",
    "outcome": "harm",
    "outcome_label": "Ended in harm"
   },
   {
    "id": "REG-0017",
    "short": "Tesla FSD reduced visibility",
    "text": "NHTSA Standing General Order 2021-01",
    "outcome": "harm",
    "outcome_label": "Ended in harm"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-002",
  "title": "49 CFR Part 573: defect and noncompliance reports (the safety recall process)",
  "short": "49 CFR Part 573 (recalls)",
  "body": "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "reporting"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force",
  "url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-573",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "A manufacturer that learns of a safety defect must notify the regulator and owners and remedy the defect; software recalls run through the same process.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-R4",
    "basis": "the recall is the organizational recovery process with regulator visibility (Waymo, Zoox)",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Part 573",
   "recall process",
   "defect investigation"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0002",
    "short": "Zoox smoke scene 2026",
    "text": "Part 573 safety recall process",
    "outcome": "averted_by_control",
    "outcome_label": "Stopped by the operator's control"
   },
   {
    "id": "REG-0013",
    "short": "Waymo construction zones 2026",
    "text": "Part 573 recall process",
    "outcome": "averted_by_control",
    "outcome_label": "Stopped by the operator's control"
   },
   {
    "id": "REG-0017",
    "short": "Tesla FSD reduced visibility",
    "text": "NHTSA defect investigation authority",
    "outcome": "harm",
    "outcome_label": "Ended in harm"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-003",
  "title": "California DMV autonomous vehicle regulations (13 CCR §§ 227–228, revised April 2026) and AB 1777",
  "short": "California DMV AV regulations",
  "body": "California Department of Motor Vehicles",
  "jurisdiction": "California, United States",
  "scope": "us_state_local",
  "themes": [
   "authorization",
   "reporting"
  ],
  "kind": "permit",
  "status": "in force; revised regulations approved April 28, 2026, some provisions phasing in; notices of AV noncompliance from July 1, 2026",
  "url": "https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/news-and-media/new-autonomous-vehicle-regulations-strengthen-oversight-and-enforcement-authorize-trucks-and-transit/",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "Permits for testing and deploying autonomous vehicles, now including heavy-duty trucks (one million test miles, 200,000 in California, before driverless commercial deployment). Manufacturers must clear an area within two minutes of an emergency geofencing directive, keep two-way communication with first responders answered within 30 seconds, give responders access to a manual override, license and train remote drivers and assistants, answer police notices of noncompliance, and report system failures, immobilizations, hard braking, collisions, and miles driven.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-E2",
    "basis": "emergency geofencing directives: the fleet must leave and avoid the designated area within two minutes",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R3",
    "basis": "two-way communication with first responders answered within 30 seconds, and remote drivers and assistants licensed and trained",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-X2",
    "basis": "first responders must be given access to a manual override and an interaction plan that explains how to stop and remove the vehicle",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "reporting of system failures, immobilizations, hard braking, collisions, and miles traveled; responses to notices of noncompliance",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "California DMV"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0003",
    "short": "Cruise 2023",
    "text": "California DMV autonomous vehicle regulations (13 CCR 227 and 228)",
    "outcome": "harm",
    "outcome_label": "Ended in harm"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-004",
  "title": "CPUC driverless passenger service permits",
  "short": "CPUC driverless permits",
  "body": "California Public Utilities Commission",
  "jurisdiction": "California, United States",
  "scope": "us_state_local",
  "themes": [
   "authorization"
  ],
  "kind": "permit",
  "status": "in force",
  "url": "https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/regulatory-services/licensing/transportation-licensing-and-analysis-branch/autonomous-vehicle-programs",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "Carrying paying passengers without a driver requires a permit with a passenger safety plan, quarterly reporting, and conditions the commission can enforce.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "quarterly and incident reporting to the commission",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R4",
    "basis": "the passenger safety plan is the organizational recovery process",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "CPUC"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0003",
    "short": "Cruise 2023",
    "text": "CPUC driverless passenger service permits",
    "outcome": "harm",
    "outcome_label": "Ended in harm"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-005",
  "title": "SEC Rule 15c3-5, the market access rule",
  "short": "SEC Rule 15c3-5",
  "body": "Securities and Exchange Commission",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "governance"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force",
  "url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-17/chapter-II/part-240/section-240.15c3-5",
  "worlds": [
   "transaction"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "com"
  ],
  "summary": "A broker-dealer with market access must have risk-management controls that prevent orders exceeding pre-set credit or capital thresholds, erroneous orders, and orders that break rules, applied automatically before the order goes out.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-X1",
    "basis": "pre-set credit and capital thresholds that reject orders automatically",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-D1",
    "basis": "pre-trade validation of orders before they reach the market",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-X2",
    "basis": "the firm must be able to stop its own flow immediately (Knight)",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "15c3-5",
   "Market Access"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0007",
    "short": "Knight Capital 2012",
    "text": "SEC Rule 15c3-5 (Market Access Rule)",
    "outcome": "harm",
    "outcome_label": "Ended in harm"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-006",
  "title": "EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), high-risk obligations",
  "short": "EU AI Act",
  "body": "European Union",
  "jurisdiction": "European Union",
  "scope": "foreign_reaches_us",
  "scope_note": "Reaches a US company that places an AI system on the EU market or whose system's output is used in the EU (Article 2). Listed for that reach, not as a US rule.",
  "themes": [
   "governance",
   "reporting"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force; high-risk obligations phasing in from 2026",
  "url": "https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj",
  "worlds": [
   "software",
   "transaction",
   "bridge",
   "physical"
  ],
  "summary": "High-risk AI systems must have a risk management system, automatic event logging, human oversight that lets a person intervene or stop the system, accuracy and robustness including resilience to manipulation, and serious-incident reporting.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "Article 12: automatic recording of events over the system's lifetime",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R3",
    "basis": "Article 14: human oversight with the ability to intervene, interrupt, or stop",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-I1",
    "basis": "Article 15: resilience against attempts to alter use or performance through manipulated inputs",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-I3",
    "basis": "Article 15: accuracy and robustness, including against errors and inconsistencies",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "Article 73: serious incident reporting to market surveillance authorities",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "EU AI Act",
   "AI Act"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-008",
  "title": "UN Regulation No. 155: cyber security and cyber security management system",
  "short": "UN Regulation 155",
  "body": "UNECE World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations",
  "jurisdiction": "Contracting parties to the 1958 Agreement (not the United States)",
  "scope": "outside_us",
  "scope_note": "Not in force in the United States, which is not a party to the 1958 Agreement. Kept because a case cites it; it is not a US obligation.",
  "themes": [
   "cyber"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force",
  "url": "https://unece.org/transport/documents/2021/03/standards/un-regulation-no-155-cyber-security-and-cyber-security",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "Vehicle type approval requires a certified cyber security management system covering the vehicle's lifecycle, including monitoring, detection, and response to attacks on vehicle systems.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-A1",
    "basis": "authentication of remote commands to the vehicle (Kia dealer portal)",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E5",
    "basis": "isolation between external interfaces and vehicle control",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "monitoring and detection require logging the vehicle's own stack cannot alter",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "R155"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0018",
    "short": "Kia dealer portal 2024",
    "text": "UN R155 (vehicle cybersecurity management) for newer markets; not directly applicable in the United States",
    "outcome": "averted_by_disclosure",
    "outcome_label": "Caught first by researchers"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-009",
  "title": "ISO 21448: safety of the intended functionality (SOTIF)",
  "short": "ISO 21448 (SOTIF)",
  "body": "International Organization for Standardization",
  "jurisdiction": "International standard",
  "scope": "international_standard",
  "themes": [
   "safety"
  ],
  "kind": "standard",
  "status": "published 2022",
  "url": "https://www.iso.org/standard/77490.html",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "Addresses hazards from performance limitations of the intended function, such as sensors that cannot see in some conditions, rather than from component failures; requires identifying unknown unsafe scenarios and restricting operation to known safe ones.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-I3",
    "basis": "the standard's core concern is detecting when perception is outside its validated conditions",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E2",
    "basis": "restricting operation to the validated operational design domain",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-I2",
    "basis": "redundancy and disagreement checks are the usual mitigation for sensor limitation",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "21448",
   "SOTIF"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-010",
  "title": "IEC 61511: functional safety of safety instrumented systems for the process industry",
  "short": "IEC 61511",
  "body": "International Electrotechnical Commission",
  "jurisdiction": "International standard",
  "scope": "international_standard",
  "themes": [
   "safety"
  ],
  "kind": "standard",
  "status": "published (edition 2, 2016, amended 2017)",
  "url": null,
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "ind"
  ],
  "summary": "Safety instrumented systems must bring a process to a safe state on demand, be independent of the basic process control system, and be designed, tested, and maintained to a specified integrity level.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-R2",
    "basis": "the safety instrumented system is the automated fail-safe (Triton: the plant tripped)",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E4",
    "basis": "physical safety interlock independent of the control layer",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E5",
    "basis": "independence from the basic process control system is a containment requirement",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "61511"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "link_pending": true,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0014",
    "short": "Triton 2017",
    "text": "IEC 61511 (functional safety for process industries)",
    "outcome": "averted_by_control",
    "outcome_label": "Stopped by the operator's control"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-011",
  "title": "ISO 10218: robots and robotic devices, safety requirements for industrial robots (adopted in the United States as ANSI/A3 R15.06-2025)",
  "short": "ISO 10218 / ANSI/A3 R15.06",
  "body": "International Organization for Standardization",
  "jurisdiction": "International standard",
  "scope": "international_standard",
  "themes": [
   "safety"
  ],
  "kind": "standard",
  "status": "published (ISO 2025 revision; US national adoption ANSI/A3 R15.06-2025, September 2025)",
  "url": "https://www.iso.org/standard/51330.html",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "rob"
  ],
  "summary": "Industrial robots must have safeguarded spaces, protective stops, and means to prevent the robot from moving while a person is in reach, with speed and force limits for collaborative operation.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-E4",
    "basis": "protective stops and safeguarded spaces are physical interlocks (Korea sorting robot)",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-I3",
    "basis": "a person must be detected as a person, or operation must stop",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "10218"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0019",
    "short": "Sorting robot, Korea 2023 (boundary)",
    "text": "ISO 10218 (industrial robot safety); Korean occupational safety law",
    "outcome": "harm",
    "outcome_label": "Ended in harm"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-012",
  "title": "14 CFR 25.1309: equipment, systems, and installations (transport aircraft certification)",
  "short": "14 CFR 25.1309",
  "body": "Federal Aviation Administration",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "safety"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force",
  "url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-C/part-25/subpart-F/section-25.1309",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "air"
  ],
  "summary": "Systems must be designed so that a failure condition that would prevent continued safe flight is extremely improbable, with warning information to let the crew take corrective action; the basis for redundancy and failure analysis in transport aircraft.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-I2",
    "basis": "a single sensor driving a flight control function failed this standard's intent (MCAS)",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-I4",
    "basis": "warning information adequate for the crew to act",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R3",
    "basis": "the crew must be able to take corrective action within the time available",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Part 25",
   "FAA certification"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0009",
    "short": "Boeing 737 MAX MCAS",
    "text": "FAA certification rules (Part 25)",
    "outcome": "harm",
    "outcome_label": "Ended in harm"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-013",
  "title": "OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications",
  "short": "OWASP LLM Top 10",
  "body": "OWASP Foundation",
  "jurisdiction": "Guidance, no jurisdiction",
  "scope": "international_standard",
  "themes": [
   "cyber"
  ],
  "kind": "guidance",
  "status": "2025 edition",
  "url": "https://genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10/",
  "worlds": [
   "software",
   "transaction",
   "bridge"
  ],
  "summary": "Names prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, excessive agency, and improper output handling among the top risks for applications built on language models, with mitigations for each.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-I1",
    "basis": "LLM01 prompt injection: treat retrieved and user content as data",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E1",
    "basis": "LLM06 excessive agency: limit the extensions, permissions, and autonomy granted",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E3",
    "basis": "excessive agency mitigations include human approval for high-impact actions",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "logging and monitoring of agent actions",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "OWASP"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-014",
  "title": "NIST AI Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)",
  "short": "NIST AI RMF",
  "body": "National Institute of Standards and Technology",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (voluntary)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "governance"
  ],
  "kind": "guidance",
  "status": "published 2023",
  "url": "https://www.nist.gov/itl/ai-risk-management-framework",
  "worlds": [
   "software",
   "transaction",
   "bridge",
   "physical"
  ],
  "summary": "A voluntary framework for governing, mapping, measuring, and managing AI risk, including documenting intended use and limits, logging, and incident response.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-M1",
    "basis": "Map: document the intended purpose, context, and limits of the system for those who operate it",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "Measure and Manage: logging and monitoring of system behavior",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R4",
    "basis": "Manage: incident response and recovery processes",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "NIST"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-015",
  "title": "Colorado automated decision-making technology law (SB 26-189, replacing the Colorado AI Act, SB 24-205)",
  "short": "Colorado ADMT law (SB 26-189)",
  "body": "State of Colorado",
  "jurisdiction": "Colorado, United States",
  "scope": "us_state_local",
  "scope_note": "Executive Order 14365 (December 2025) directs a federal challenge to state AI laws judged onerous; it does not by itself preempt this law, which remains enforceable unless Congress or a court says otherwise.",
  "themes": [
   "people"
  ],
  "kind": "statute",
  "status": "enacted May 14, 2026; effective January 1, 2027; Attorney General rulemaking due by then",
  "url": "https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb26-189",
  "worlds": [
   "software"
  ],
  "summary": "Repeals and re-enacts the 2024 Colorado AI Act as narrower rules on automated decision-making technology that materially influences consequential decisions (employment, housing, lending, insurance, health care, education, essential government services). Deployers must give notice before use, explain an adverse outcome and the technology's role, let consumers correct data and request meaningful human review by someone with authority to change the decision, and keep records for three years; developers must document intended uses, known harmful uses, and limits. The earlier duty of care, risk-management program, and impact assessments are removed.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-M1",
    "basis": "notice to the consumer before the technology is used to materially influence a consequential decision, and developer documentation of intended and known harmful uses",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E6",
    "basis": "right to meaningful human review and reconsideration by a reviewer with authority to change the decision, who must not simply defer to the system",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "records kept for at least three years after a consequential decision",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Colorado",
   "Colorado AI Act",
   "SB 24-205",
   "SB 26-189",
   "automated-decision laws"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0020",
    "short": "Mobley v. Workday",
    "text": "Age Discrimination in Employment Act; Title VII; Americans with Disabilities Act; California Fair Employment and Housing Act (pleaded); state automated-decision laws (none appears among the claims in the court orders)",
    "outcome": "pending",
    "outcome_label": "Pending"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-016",
  "title": "New York City Local Law 144: automated employment decision tools",
  "short": "NYC Local Law 144",
  "body": "New York City Department of Consumer and Worker Protection",
  "jurisdiction": "New York City, United States",
  "scope": "us_state_local",
  "themes": [
   "people"
  ],
  "kind": "statute",
  "status": "in force (enforced from July 2023)",
  "url": "https://www.nyc.gov/site/dca/about/automated-employment-decision-tools.page",
  "worlds": [
   "software"
  ],
  "summary": "An automated tool used to screen candidates or employees must have an independent bias audit within the past year, with the results published and candidates notified before use.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-M1",
    "basis": "notice to candidates that the tool is used",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V3",
    "basis": "an independent audit of the tool's outcomes, not the vendor's own account",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "required"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Local Law 144",
   "automated employment"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-017",
  "title": "Connected vehicles rule: vehicle connectivity systems and automated driving systems with a China or Russia nexus (15 CFR part 791, subpart D)",
  "short": "BIS connected vehicles rule",
  "body": "Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "provenance",
   "cyber"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force from March 17, 2025; software prohibitions from model year 2027; hardware prohibitions from model year 2030 (January 1, 2029 for units without a model year); vehicles over 10,000 lb to be addressed in a later rule",
  "url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-15/subtitle-B/chapter-VII/subchapter-E/part-791/subpart-D",
  "worlds": [
   "physical",
   "bridge"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "Prohibits importing vehicle connectivity system hardware, and importing or selling connected vehicles that run vehicle connectivity or automated driving system software, designed, developed, manufactured, or supplied by persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of China or Russia; a manufacturer with that nexus may not sell connected vehicles in the United States at all. The stated risk is compelled data sharing and remote access to vehicles on US roads. If one subcomponent of an automated driving system is supplied from that nexus, the whole software suite is treated as such. Importers and manufacturers file annual Declarations of Conformity with recordkeeping; specific and general authorizations and advisory opinions are available.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-A3",
    "basis": "§§ 791.302–791.304: prohibited hardware, covered software (vehicle connectivity and automated driving system software), and manufacturer transactions with a China or Russia nexus",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E5",
    "basis": "the rule's stated purpose: removing a path by which a foreign party could reach vehicle systems remotely through the connectivity system",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "§ 791.305: annual Declaration of Conformity, with records kept and material changes reported within 60 days",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "connected vehicles rule",
   "Connected Vehicles",
   "vehicle connectivity system",
   "15 CFR 791"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-018",
  "title": "FCC Covered List: foreign-produced uncrewed aircraft systems and critical components, and DJI and Autel equipment (Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act; FY2025 NDAA § 1709)",
  "short": "FCC Covered List: foreign drones",
  "body": "Federal Communications Commission",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "provenance"
  ],
  "kind": "order",
  "status": "in force from December 22, 2025 for new equipment authorizations; July 2026 proposal to bar continued import and marketing of named previously authorized models; component and bill-of-materials rules proposed July 2026",
  "url": "https://www.fcc.gov/covered-list-faqs-uas-and-uas-critical-components",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "air"
  ],
  "summary": "Adds all uncrewed aircraft systems and their critical components produced in foreign countries (flight controllers, navigation, data links, ground control stations, sensors and cameras, batteries, motors), and all DJI and Autel communications and video surveillance equipment and software, to the Covered List, so they cannot receive new FCC equipment authorization. Previously authorized models remain usable. The Departments of Defense and Homeland Security may exempt specific systems; a later order closes a component loophole for devices containing logic-bearing parts from listed entities.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-A3",
    "basis": "the national security determination of December 21, 2025: equipment authorization is denied by country of production and by named producer, including critical components such as flight controllers and data links",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Covered List",
   "FCC drone"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-019",
  "title": "NHTSA Cybersecurity Best Practices for the Safety of Modern Vehicles (2022)",
  "short": "NHTSA vehicle cybersecurity practices",
  "body": "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (voluntary)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "cyber"
  ],
  "kind": "guidance",
  "status": "published September 2022",
  "url": "https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/2022-09/cybersecurity-best-practices-safety-modern-vehicles-2022-tag.pdf",
  "worlds": [
   "physical",
   "bridge"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "The regulator's expectations for vehicle cybersecurity across the life of the vehicle: a risk-based process, protection of safety-critical systems from external interfaces, control of diagnostic and remote access, secure over-the-air updates, logging to support incident detection and investigation, and a vulnerability disclosure path for outside researchers.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-E5",
    "basis": "isolation and segmentation of safety-critical vehicle systems from external connectivity",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-A1",
    "basis": "authentication and access control for diagnostic, service, and remote interfaces",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "logging that supports detection and later investigation of cyber incidents",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-O1",
    "basis": "a vulnerability reporting and disclosure policy for outside researchers",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Cybersecurity Best Practices for the Safety of Modern Vehicles"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-020",
  "title": "FMVSS No. 127: automatic emergency braking systems for light vehicles (49 CFR 571.127)",
  "short": "FMVSS 127 (automatic emergency braking)",
  "body": "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "safety"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "final rule 2024; compliance from September 1, 2029; a proposal to extend lead time by two years is in preparation (March 2026); industry challenge held in abeyance",
  "url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2024/11/26/2024-27349/federal-motor-vehicle-safety-standards-automatic-emergency-braking-systems-for-light-vehicles",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "New passenger cars and light trucks must have automatic emergency braking that avoids collisions with vehicles and pedestrians across specified speeds, day and night, with a forward collision warning and a telltale when the system is malfunctioning or switched off.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-R2",
    "basis": "the vehicle must brake on its own to avoid the collision when the driver does not",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-I4",
    "basis": "forward collision warning to the driver before automatic braking",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-I3",
    "basis": "malfunction indication when the system cannot perform",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "required"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "FMVSS 127",
   "automatic emergency braking"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-021",
  "title": "Texas authorization for automated motor vehicles in commercial service (SB 2807; Transportation Code ch. 545, subch. J)",
  "short": "Texas AV authorization (SB 2807)",
  "body": "Texas Department of Motor Vehicles",
  "jurisdiction": "Texas, United States",
  "scope": "us_state_local",
  "themes": [
   "authorization",
   "safety"
  ],
  "kind": "statute",
  "status": "enacted 2025; authorization required from May 28, 2026",
  "url": "https://www.txdmv.gov/AVprogram",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "A company must hold a Department of Motor Vehicles authorization before operating driverless vehicles commercially. It must certify that the vehicle can reach a minimal risk condition if the automated driving system fails, that the Department of Public Safety holds a first responder interaction plan, and that insurance is in place; it must report material changes within 30 days. The Department may suspend, revoke, or restrict an authorization when operation endangers the public.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-R2",
    "basis": "the vehicle must be able to achieve a minimal risk condition if the automated driving system fails",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-X2",
    "basis": "§ 545.455: a first responder interaction plan on file with the Department of Public Safety, explaining how emergency personnel stop and handle the vehicle",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R4",
    "basis": "the regulator may suspend, revoke, or restrict an authorization after unsafe operation, with notice and a cure process",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "material changes reported to the Department within 30 days",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "SB 2807",
   "Texas authorization"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-022",
  "title": "NHTSA exemptions for automated vehicles without manual controls (49 CFR part 555 and the Automated Vehicle Exemption Program)",
  "short": "NHTSA Part 555 and AV exemptions",
  "body": "National Highway Traffic Safety Administration",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "authorization"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force; exemption process streamlined 2025; individual applications pending",
  "url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-49/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-555/subpart-A",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "road"
  ],
  "summary": "A vehicle that cannot meet a federal motor vehicle safety standard because it has no steering wheel or pedals may be sold or operated only under an exemption, granted in limited numbers and for a limited time where the agency finds it in the public interest and the vehicle at least as safe as a compliant one; exemptions carry reporting conditions. A parallel program covers non-commercial demonstration of domestically built automated vehicles.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "exemptions are granted with conditions that include reporting to the agency during the exemption period",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R4",
    "basis": "the agency can limit numbers, set terms, and end an exemption, giving the regulator visibility of fleet performance",
    "confidence": "low",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Part 555",
   "Automated Vehicle Exemption Program"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": [
   {
    "id": "REG-0002",
    "short": "Zoox smoke scene 2026",
    "text": "NHTSA Automated Vehicle Exemption Program reporting obligation (Zoox notified NHTSA of the event on 25 June 2026)",
    "outcome": "averted_by_control",
    "outcome_label": "Stopped by the operator's control"
   }
  ]
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-023",
  "title": "FAA Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft (14 CFR part 89)",
  "short": "FAA Remote ID (Part 89)",
  "body": "Federal Aviation Administration",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "safety",
   "reporting"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force (operator compliance from March 2024)",
  "url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-F/part-89",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "air"
  ],
  "summary": "Drones flying in US airspace must broadcast their identity, position, altitude, velocity, and control station location, either built in or through a broadcast module, so that the aircraft and its operator can be identified in flight by anyone with a receiver.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-V3",
    "basis": "§ 89.305: the aircraft itself broadcasts identity and location, so a third party can identify it without relying on the manufacturer",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-A1",
    "basis": "a serial number registered to the operator is bound to the broadcast identity",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Remote ID",
   "14 CFR part 89"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-024",
  "title": "FAA proposed rule: normalizing beyond visual line of sight drone operations (proposed 14 CFR part 108)",
  "short": "FAA Part 108 BVLOS (proposed)",
  "body": "Federal Aviation Administration",
  "jurisdiction": "United States",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "authorization",
   "safety",
   "cyber"
  ],
  "kind": "proposed rule",
  "status": "proposed August 7, 2025; comments reopened January 2026; final rule under White House review from July 2026",
  "url": "https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/beyond-visual-line-sight-bvlos",
  "worlds": [
   "physical"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "air"
  ],
  "summary": "Would let drones fly beyond the operator's sight under an operating permit or certificate rather than case-by-case waivers. As proposed: drones yield to crewed aircraft, monitor conformance of the actual flight against declared intent and alert the operator, resist interference and unauthorized access, and survive any single power or propulsion failure without losing control; certificated operators keep a safety management system.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-I4",
    "basis": "conformance monitoring that compares the flight with the declared operational intent and alerts the operator",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "proposed"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R2",
    "basis": "no single power or propulsion failure may cause loss of flight control",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "proposed"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-A1",
    "basis": "command and control links and systems must resist unauthorized access and interference",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "proposed"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E2",
    "basis": "operations bounded by the permit's area and the duty to yield to crewed aircraft",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "proposed"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Part 108",
   "beyond visual line of sight"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-025",
  "title": "NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection standards (CIP-005, CIP-007, CIP-013, CIP-015), approved by FERC",
  "short": "NERC CIP standards",
  "body": "North American Electric Reliability Corporation, approved by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (bulk electric system)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "cyber",
   "provenance"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "mandatory and enforceable; CIP-015 internal network monitoring enforceable from October 1, 2028, expanded by CIP-015-2 (approved August 2026) through 2031",
  "url": "https://www.nerc.com/globalassets/standards/reliability-standards/cip/cip-013-2.pdf",
  "worlds": [
   "physical",
   "bridge"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "ind"
  ],
  "summary": "Mandatory cybersecurity standards for the systems that run the power grid: an electronic security perimeter around control systems, access and security-event management, supply chain risk management plans for vendors of control system hardware and software, and monitoring of network traffic inside the trusted zone to detect anomalous activity.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-A3",
    "basis": "CIP-013: supply chain risk management plans covering vendor products, including verification of software integrity and authenticity",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E5",
    "basis": "CIP-005: electronic security perimeter and controlled remote access to control systems",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "CIP-007 security event logging and CIP-015 internal network security monitoring",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-A1",
    "basis": "CIP-004 and CIP-007 access management and authentication for control systems",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "NERC CIP",
   "CIP-013",
   "CIP-015"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-026",
  "title": "TSA Security Directive Pipeline-2021-02 series: cybersecurity of pipeline and LNG control systems",
  "short": "TSA pipeline security directive",
  "body": "Transportation Security Administration",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (designated pipeline and LNG operators)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "cyber"
  ],
  "kind": "order",
  "status": "in force; reissued and ratified annually (current version 2021-02F)",
  "url": "https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2022/07/21/tsa-revises-and-reissues-cybersecurity-requirements-pipeline-owners",
  "worlds": [
   "physical",
   "bridge"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "ind"
  ],
  "summary": "Designated operators must keep operational technology running safely if the IT network is compromised, control access to critical cyber systems, continuously monitor for and correct anomalies, patch on a risk basis, and maintain a TSA-approved implementation plan, an incident response plan, and an assessment program with testing and audits.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-E5",
    "basis": "network segmentation so operational technology keeps running safely if information technology is compromised",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-A1",
    "basis": "access control measures that keep unauthorized users out of critical cyber systems",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-I4",
    "basis": "continuous monitoring and detection that surfaces and corrects anomalies",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R1",
    "basis": "an incident response plan and segmentation that keep operations recoverable outside the compromised domain",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Security Directive Pipeline",
   "TSA security directive"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-027",
  "title": "Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA)",
  "short": "CIRCIA incident reporting",
  "body": "Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (covered critical infrastructure entities)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "reporting"
  ],
  "kind": "statute",
  "status": "enacted 2022; final rule under White House review (October 2026), expected before the end of 2026; reporting duties start when the rule takes effect",
  "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/cyber-threats-and-advisories/information-sharing/cyber-incident-reporting-critical-infrastructure-act-2022-circia",
  "worlds": [
   "physical",
   "bridge",
   "software",
   "transaction"
  ],
  "summary": "Covered critical infrastructure entities will have to report substantial cyber incidents to CISA within 72 hours and ransom payments within 24 hours, and preserve related data.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "72-hour incident and 24-hour ransom payment reports, with supplemental reports as facts develop",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "the proposed rule's data preservation requirement for records relating to a reported incident",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "proposed"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "CIRCIA"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-028",
  "title": "SEC cybersecurity risk management and incident disclosure rules for public companies (Form 8-K Item 1.05; Regulation S-K Item 106)",
  "short": "SEC cyber incident disclosure",
  "body": "Securities and Exchange Commission",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (public companies)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "reporting",
   "governance"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force since December 2023",
  "url": "https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2023/33-11216.pdf",
  "worlds": [
   "physical",
   "bridge",
   "software",
   "transaction"
  ],
  "summary": "A public company must disclose a cybersecurity incident it determines to be material within four business days of that determination, and describe annually its processes for assessing and managing cybersecurity risk and the board's oversight of them.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "Item 1.05: disclosure of a material cybersecurity incident within four business days of the materiality determination",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R4",
    "basis": "Item 106: annual description of risk management processes and board oversight",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Item 1.05",
   "SEC cybersecurity disclosure"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-029",
  "title": "SEC Regulation S-P amendments: incident response and customer notification (2024)",
  "short": "SEC Regulation S-P",
  "body": "Securities and Exchange Commission",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (broker-dealers, investment advisers, funds, transfer agents)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "reporting",
   "cyber"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "in force; compliance from December 3, 2025 (larger entities) and June 3, 2026 (smaller entities)",
  "url": "https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/final/2024/34-100155.pdf",
  "worlds": [
   "transaction",
   "software"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "com"
  ],
  "summary": "Covered financial firms must keep a written incident response program to detect, respond to, and recover from unauthorized access to customer information, notify affected customers within 30 days, and oversee service providers, which must notify the firm of a breach within 72 hours.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-R4",
    "basis": "a written incident response program to detect, respond to, and recover from unauthorized access",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "customer notification within 30 days and service-provider notification to the firm within 72 hours",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-A2",
    "basis": "oversight of service providers that handle customer information on the firm's behalf",
    "confidence": "low",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Regulation S-P"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-030",
  "title": "Interagency revised guidance on model risk management (SR 26-2 / OCC Bulletin 2026-13), replacing SR 11-7",
  "short": "Bank model risk guidance (SR 26-2)",
  "body": "Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (banks; most relevant above $30 billion in assets)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "scope_note": "Agents moving money at banks currently sit outside this guidance by its own terms. Until the promised request for information produces something, no federal banking guidance specifically governs agentic AI.",
  "themes": [
   "governance"
  ],
  "kind": "guidance",
  "status": "issued April 17, 2026; replaces SR 11-7 and OCC 2011-12; excludes generative and agentic AI, pending a request for information",
  "url": "https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/SR2602.htm",
  "worlds": [
   "transaction"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "com"
  ],
  "summary": "Risk-based expectations for models banks rely on: an inventory, validation scaled to complexity and materiality and generally done before use, and ongoing monitoring. The guidance does not set enforceable standards. A footnote excludes generative and agentic AI models as novel and rapidly evolving; banks are to govern them through broader risk management until the agencies say more.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-D1",
    "basis": "validation of conceptual soundness and outcomes, generally before the model is put into use",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-I3",
    "basis": "ongoing monitoring of model performance and data quality",
    "confidence": "low",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "SR 11-7",
   "SR 26-2",
   "model risk management"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-031",
  "title": "FINRA 2026 Annual Regulatory Oversight Report: generative AI and AI agents",
  "short": "FINRA 2026 report on AI agents",
  "body": "Financial Industry Regulatory Authority",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (broker-dealers)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "governance"
  ],
  "kind": "guidance",
  "status": "published December 2025",
  "url": "https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/guidance/reports/2026-finra-annual-regulatory-oversight-report/gen-ai",
  "worlds": [
   "transaction",
   "software"
  ],
  "sectors": [
   "com"
  ],
  "summary": "Names the risks of AI agents at member firms (acting without human validation, acting beyond the user's intended scope and authority, hard-to-trace multi-step reasoning, mishandling sensitive data, misaligned reward functions) and encourages agent-specific supervision: monitoring agents' system and data access, deciding where a human must review, tracking agent actions and decisions, and guardrails that constrain behavior, within existing duties on supervision, communications, recordkeeping, and fair dealing.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-M2",
    "basis": "guardrails that constrain agent behavior to the user's actual and intended scope and authority",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E1",
    "basis": "monitoring and limiting what systems and data an agent can reach",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R3",
    "basis": "deciding where human-in-the-loop review is required before an agent's action stands",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "tracking agent actions and decisions so outcomes can be traced",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "FINRA"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-032",
  "title": "OMB memoranda M-25-21 and M-25-22: federal use and acquisition of AI",
  "short": "OMB M-25-21 and M-25-22",
  "body": "Office of Management and Budget",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (federal agencies and their AI vendors)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "scope_note": "Binds federal agencies; reaches US companies through federal contracts, which must carry the minimum practices for high-impact AI.",
  "themes": [
   "governance"
  ],
  "kind": "guidance",
  "status": "issued April 3, 2025",
  "url": "https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/M-25-21-Accelerating-Federal-Use-of-AI-through-Innovation-Governance-and-Public-Trust.pdf",
  "worlds": [
   "software",
   "transaction",
   "physical"
  ],
  "summary": "For AI whose output is a principal basis for decisions with significant effects on rights or safety, agencies must test before deployment, assess impact before and during use, provide human oversight and intervention, offer remedies or appeals, and stop or pause systems that fall short. Acquisition guidance requires contracts that allow ongoing monitoring, bar training on government data without consent, and consider disclosure of unanticipated vendor AI use.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-D1",
    "basis": "M-25-21: pre-deployment testing of high-impact AI in conditions matching intended use",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R3",
    "basis": "M-25-21: human oversight, intervention, and remedies or appeals for affected individuals",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-X2",
    "basis": "M-25-21: cease or pause high-impact AI that does not meet the minimum practices",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-M1",
    "basis": "M-25-22: disclosure of AI use by the vendor in performing the contract",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "M-25-21",
   "M-25-22"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-033",
  "title": "NIST AI 600-1: Generative AI Profile of the AI Risk Management Framework",
  "short": "NIST AI 600-1 (generative AI)",
  "body": "National Institute of Standards and Technology",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (voluntary)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "governance",
   "cyber"
  ],
  "kind": "guidance",
  "status": "published July 2024",
  "url": "https://www.nist.gov/publications/artificial-intelligence-risk-management-framework-generative-artificial-intelligence",
  "worlds": [
   "software",
   "transaction"
  ],
  "summary": "Federal guidance on the risks specific to generative AI, including information security risks such as prompt injection and data poisoning, with suggested actions for governing, mapping, measuring, and managing them: provenance of content and components, incident disclosure, and monitoring.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-I1",
    "basis": "information security risks: direct and indirect prompt injection through content the system reads",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-A3",
    "basis": "value chain and component integration: provenance of third-party models, data, and components",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-O1",
    "basis": "incident disclosure and engagement with outside reporters of issues",
    "confidence": "low",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "NIST AI 600-1",
   "Generative AI Profile"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-034",
  "title": "California Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act (SB 53)",
  "short": "California SB 53 (frontier AI)",
  "body": "State of California",
  "jurisdiction": "California, United States",
  "scope": "us_state_local",
  "themes": [
   "reporting",
   "governance"
  ],
  "kind": "statute",
  "status": "in force from January 1, 2026",
  "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB53",
  "worlds": [
   "software"
  ],
  "summary": "Large developers of frontier models (trained with more than 10^26 operations, over $500 million revenue) must publish a frontier AI framework for assessing and mitigating catastrophic risk, publish a transparency report for each new model, report critical safety incidents to the Office of Emergency Services within 15 days (24 hours where there is imminent risk of death or serious injury), and protect employees who report risks.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "critical safety incident reports within 15 days, or 24 hours for imminent risk of death or serious injury",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R4",
    "basis": "a published frontier AI framework and transparency reports, with an anonymous internal reporting channel",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "SB 53",
   "Transparency in Frontier Artificial Intelligence Act"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-035",
  "title": "New York Responsible AI Safety and Education (RAISE) Act",
  "short": "New York RAISE Act",
  "body": "State of New York",
  "jurisdiction": "New York, United States",
  "scope": "us_state_local",
  "themes": [
   "reporting",
   "governance"
  ],
  "kind": "statute",
  "status": "signed December 2025; chapter amendments 2026; effective January 1, 2027",
  "url": "https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-signs-nation-leading-legislation-require-ai-frameworks-ai-frontier-models",
  "worlds": [
   "software"
  ],
  "summary": "Large frontier model developers must publish safety and security protocols and transparency reports and report safety incidents to the Department of Financial Services within 72 hours (24 hours where there is imminent risk of death or serious injury).",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-V2",
    "basis": "safety incident reports within 72 hours, or 24 hours for imminent risk of death or serious injury",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-R4",
    "basis": "published safety and security protocols for catastrophic risk",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "RAISE Act"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-036",
  "title": "California CCPA regulations on automated decisionmaking technology, risk assessments, and cybersecurity audits",
  "short": "California ADMT regulations",
  "body": "California Privacy Protection Agency",
  "jurisdiction": "California, United States",
  "scope": "us_state_local",
  "themes": [
   "people",
   "cyber"
  ],
  "kind": "regulation",
  "status": "finalized September 2025; ADMT obligations from April 1, 2027; first cybersecurity audits due from April 1, 2028",
  "url": "https://cppa.ca.gov/regulations/ccpa_updates.html",
  "worlds": [
   "software",
   "transaction"
  ],
  "summary": "A business using technology that replaces or substantially replaces human decision-making for significant decisions about consumers (finance, housing, education, employment, health care) must assess risk, give notice before use, offer an opt-out or a human appeal, and explain the logic on request; larger businesses must also commission independent cybersecurity audits.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-M1",
    "basis": "pre-use notice describing the technology and how its output is used",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E6",
    "basis": "opt-out, or an appeal to a human reviewer who can overturn the decision",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "required"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-D1",
    "basis": "a risk assessment before the processing begins",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "implied"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "CCPA",
   "automated decisionmaking technology"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-037",
  "title": "Key Practices for Incident Readiness and Response in Super Intelligence Training and Evaluation (NIST CAISSI, NSA SISC and CISA, PP-26-4396, version 1.0)",
  "short": "NIST/NSA/CISA agent incident practices",
  "body": "National Institute of Standards and Technology Center for Advancing Innovation and Standards for Super Intelligence, National Security Agency Super Intelligence Security Center, and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (voluntary)",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "cyber",
   "reporting",
   "safety"
  ],
  "kind": "guidance",
  "status": "published October 2026",
  "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2026/10/16/Key_Practices_for_Incident_Readiness_and_Response_in_Super_Intelligence%20_Training_and_Evaluation.pdf",
  "worlds": [
   "software"
  ],
  "summary": "Ten voluntary key practices, grouped under prepare, detect, respond, recover and report, for incidents in super intelligence training and evaluation: limiting agent network access, monitoring agents cannot access or interfere with, automatic shutdown of affected agent trajectories, rebuilding environments from verified baselines before resuming, and notifying affected parties, government and the public.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-E2",
    "basis": "Practice 1, Design and Implement Technical Controls: 'Limit SI agent network access, via a strict allowlist where possible.'",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "Practice 3, Monitor for Unexpected Activity: 'Ensure that SI agents cannot access or interfere with monitoring processes and logs.'",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-X2",
    "basis": "Practice 6, Mitigate and Shut Down Undesired Activity: 'Automatically shut down impacted SI agent trajectories on detection of a control failure or in-progress SI control incident.'",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E5",
    "basis": "Practice 7, Verify and Strengthen Containment Before Resuming SI Agent Activity: 'Rebuild any environments that may have been compromised from verified baselines.'",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-O1",
    "basis": "Practices 8 to 10 (Coordinate with Affected Parties; Notify Government; Share Information Publicly): notify parties whose systems were compromised, voluntarily report to CISA, share details with the public",
    "confidence": "low",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Key Practices for Incident Readiness and Response",
   "PP-26-4396",
   "SI control incident"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 },
 {
  "id": "RULE-038",
  "title": "Careful Adoption of Agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI) Services (ASD's ACSC, CISA, NSA, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, NCSC-NZ and NCSC-UK joint guidance, 1 May 2026)",
  "short": "CISA/NSA agentic AI adoption guide",
  "body": "Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and National Security Agency, with the Australian Signals Directorate's Australian Cyber Security Centre, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre and the United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre",
  "jurisdiction": "United States (voluntary), jointly with Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom",
  "scope": "us_federal",
  "themes": [
   "cyber",
   "authorization",
   "governance"
  ],
  "kind": "guidance",
  "status": "published 1 May 2026",
  "url": "https://www.cyber.gov.au/sites/default/files/2026-05/careful_adoption_of_agentic_ai_services.pdf",
  "worlds": [
   "software"
  ],
  "summary": "Voluntary joint guidance for organizations adopting agentic AI: never grant agents broad or unrestricted access, limit agent permissions to the minimum for approved tasks, treat each agent as a distinct principal with just-in-time credentials for high-impact actions, require prior human approval before agents execute high-impact actions, log and monitor all agent operations, threat-model and red-team agents, and restrict tools to an approved allow list. Announced by CISA on 1 May 2026 (CISA bulletin); text read from the co-sealed PDF published by ASD's ACSC.",
  "requires": [
   {
    "control": "C-E1",
    "basis": "Operating agents securely, Privileges and authentication (p. 23): 'Limit privileges of AI agents to the minimum required for its task'; 'Require just-in-time credentials for high-impact or privileged actions'.",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-A1",
    "basis": "Designing secure agents, Identity management (p. 15): 'construct each agent as a distinct principal'.",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-E3",
    "basis": "Operating agents securely, Human in the loop (p. 22): 'Prevent agents from autonomously executing high impact actions or outputs without prior human approval'.",
    "confidence": "high",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-V1",
    "basis": "Operating agents securely, Monitoring and auditing (p. 21): 'Maintain comprehensive logs and real-time monitoring of live agent behaviour and decision-making'.",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   },
   {
    "control": "C-A3",
    "basis": "Developing secure agents, Manage third-party components (p. 18): 'Restrict tool use to an approved allow list of tools and versions that are regularly verified as secure'.",
    "confidence": "medium",
    "strength": "recommended"
   }
  ],
  "match": [
   "Careful Adoption of Agentic Artificial Intelligence",
   "Careful Adoption of Agentic AI Services",
   "careful_adoption_of_agentic_ai_services"
  ],
  "confirmed_by": null,
  "cases": []
 }
]